The opinion of the court was delivered by: Frank C. Damrell, Jr. United States District Judge
This matter is before the court on the motion of defendant Wachovia Mortgage, FSB ("Wachovia") to dismiss plaintiff Lisa Gates's ("plaintiff") First Amended Complaint ("FAC") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below,*fn1 defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff brought this action against Wachovia for conduct arising out of a mortgage loan (the "Loan"). On February 25, 2006, plaintiff obtained the Loan from World Savings Bank, FSB, who subsequently changed its name to Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, on December 31, 2007. (Req. for Judicial Notice ("RFJN") ¶ 1.) Plaintiff secured the loan by a deed of trust on plaintiff's current residence, 6232 Channel Islands Lane, Roseville, California. (FAC ¶¶ 9, 11.)
Plaintiff alleges that Wachovia failed to provide her with the proper copies of the Notice of Right to Cancel at the time of signing as required by the Federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), giving plaintiff up to three years to rescind the loan. (Id. ¶¶ 26-30.) On January 15, 2009, plaintiff sent a letter to Wachovia, which she alleges was a Qualified Written Request ("QWR") under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and a valid rescission under TILA. (FAC ¶ 24.) Plaintiff's letter offered to settle the matter with Wachovia by modifying the existing terms, but stated that the failure to reach an agreement would result in plaintiff's rescission of the Loan. (FAC Pl.'s Ex. B.) Plaintiff contends that Wachovia further violated TILA by failing to respond to this letter. (FAC ¶ 42.)
Plaintiff originally filed this action against Wells Fargo Bank on April 17, 2009, but amended her complaint on July 24, 2009 to remove Wells Fargo Bank and name her actual lender, Wachovia. In her FAC, plaintiff asserts claims for 1) violation of TILA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq., 2) violation of RESPA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., and 3) violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("RFDCPA"), Cal. Civil Code §§ 1788 et seq. Wachovia moves to dismiss plaintiff's FAC for failure to state cognizable claims.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). "This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege "'specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
Nevertheless, the court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. at 1950 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff "can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff has failed to "nudge [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 1952. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 1949. This plausibility inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950.
In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See Mir, 844 F.2d at 649; Isuzu Motors Ltd., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1042. Rule 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact "not subject to reasonable dispute" because the fact is either "(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The court can take judicial notice of matters of public ...