UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
March 5, 2010
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
VALERIE GARCIA, DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: The Honorable George H. King United States District Judge
FINDINGS REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS PURSUANT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ACT TRIAL DATE: 03-09-10 TRIAL TIME: 8:30 a.m.
Having heard from plaintiff, the United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, Assistant United States Attorney Benjamin R. Barron, and defendant, VALERIE GARCIA, by and through her counsel of record, Stephen Demik, at a status conference held before this Court on March 1, 2010, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby FINDS AS FOLLOWS:
1. The Indictment in this case was filed on March 11, 2009. Defendant first appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which the charges in this case were pending on March 3, 2009. The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, originally required that the trial commence on or before May 12, 2009.
2. On March 30, 2009, the Court set a trial date of April 21, 2009, and a status conference date of April 20, 2009.
3. Defendant is released on bond pending trial. The parties estimate that the trial in this matter will last approximately two to three days.
4. Defendant is charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708: possession of stolen mail.
5. On March 1, 2010, the Court held a status conference and set a trial date of March 9, 2010. The Court took defendant's oral waiver of her Speedy Trial rights regarding the time period between March 1, 2010, and the trial date of March 9, 2010.
6. The continuance is not based on congestion of the Court's calendar, lack of diligent preparation on the part of the attorney for the government or the defense, or failure on the part of the attorney for the Government to obtain available witnesses.
7. The ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial.
8. Failure to grant the continuance would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
9. Failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny defendant continuity of counsel and would deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
Accordingly, the Court finds that there are facts that support a continuance of the trial date in this matter, and good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.
THEREFORE, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN:
1. The time period of March 1, 2010, to March 9, 2010, inclusive, is excluded in computing the time within which the trial must commence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(i), and (B)(iv).
2. Defendant shall appear in Courtroom 650 of the Federal Courthouse, 255 E. Temple Street, Los Angeles, California on March 9, 2010, at 8:30 am.
3. Nothing in this Order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within which trial must commence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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