The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller United States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, AND COSTS
Plaintiff Debra Lested ("Lested") brought this ERISA action to recover long-term disability benefits pursuant to a group insurance policy issued by Defendant Life Insurance Company of North America ("LINA") to Lested's employer, Defendant Alaris Medical Systems, Inc. ("Alaris"). After a bench trial, the court reversed LINA's decision to deny benefits to Lested. (Doc. No. 31). Lested now moves for an award of attorney's fees, costs, and prejudgment interest pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). (Doc. No. 33). Defendants filed an opposition (Doc. No. 34) and Lested filed a reply. (Doc. No. 35).
The court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument. See CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the court hereby GRANTS Lested's motion for attorney's fees, prejudgment interest, and costs.
After leaving her job as a material handler for Alaris, Lested received disability benefits from LINA. (Doc. No. 31). When LINA determined that Lested was no longer disabled and discontinued Lested's benefits, Lested brought this action to reverse LINA's decision. (Id.). Following a bench trial, the court reversed LINA's decision. (Id.).
Throughout the litigation, Lested was represented by two attorneys, Charles Fleishman and Paul Fleishman. (Doc. No. 33, Declarations of Charles Fleishman and Paul Fleishman). Charles Fleishman is an experienced ERISA litigator. (Id.) Charles Fleishman ostensibly billed 18 hours to this matter, at an hourly rate of $550. (Id.) Paul Fleishman ostensibly billed 105.6 hours to this matter, at an hourly rate of $300. (Id.) Therefore, Lested requests attorney's fees totaling $41,580. In addition, Lested seeks to recover the $350 filing fee as costs. (Id.)
The award of prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, and costs under ERISA is within the court's discretion. Blankenship v. Liberty Life Ins. Co. of Boston, 486 F.3d 620, 627 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (prejudgment interest); Nelson v. EG&G Energy Measurements Group, Inc., 37 F.3d 1384, 1392 (9th Cir. 1994) (attorney's fees); Landwehr v. DuPree, 72 F.3d 726739 (9th Cir. 1995) (costs).
Under ERISA, a court may award a reasonable attorney's fee. 29 U.S.C. § 1332(g)(1). "As a general rule, ERISA employee plaintiffs should be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee 'if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.'" Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). Lested prevailed in her suit for disability benefits, therefore she is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee.
To determine a reasonable attorney's fee in an ERISA case, the court applies the hybrid lodestar/multiplier approach. Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mutual Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). First, the court determines the lodestar amount by "multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate." Id. Second, the court may adjust the lodestar amount using a multiplier based on factors not subsumed within the lodestar calculation. Id. The multiplier, however, is only proper in exceptional cases where the lodestar amount is unreasonable. Id.
A review of the attorneys' billing records demonstrates that the hours expended by Lested's attorneys are reasonable. Appropriately for an experienced supervising attorney, Charles Fleishman billed only 18 hours to this matter, focusing his efforts on reviewing the major aspects of the case and attending the early neutral evaluation conference. Paul Fleishman also focused his time on appropriate tasks such as reviewing the administrative record, drafting briefs, and attending the bench trial. There is no indication that either attorney spent unreasonable amounts of time in representing Lested.
Likewise, the court finds that the attorney's fees requested by Charles Fleishman and Paul Fleishman are reasonable. In determining an appropriate hourly rate, the court does not make reference to the actual rates charged to the prevailing party, rather "billing rates 'should be established by reference to the fees that private attorneys of an ability and reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel charge their paying clients for legal work of similar complexity.'" Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 ...