The opinion of the court was delivered by: Frank C. Damrell, Jr. United States District Judge
This matter is before the court on the motions of (1) defendants BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (erroneously sued as Bank of America Home Loans) and Recontrust Company, N.A. (Docket #28) and (2) WMC Mortgage Corporation (Docket #26) (collectively, "defendants") to dismiss plaintiff Phillip Crump's ("plaintiff") first amended complaint ("FAC") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).*fn1 On April 9, 2010, plaintiff filed statements of non-opposition to defendants' motions, in which he requested dismissal of his federal claims for relief, pursuant to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") and the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), alleged against the moving defendants as well as all other defendants.*fn2 (Docket #33, 34.)
Based on plaintiff's statements, the court dismisses the RESPA and TILA claims asserted in the FAC. See, e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a); Swedberg v. Marotzke, 339 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (a defendant's filing of a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b), does not prevent the plaintiff from later filing a voluntary dismissal).
Dismissal of the RESPA and TILA claims leaves the complaint devoid of any federal claims. The remaining claims are state law claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, violation of the California Rosenthal Act, violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., and wrongful foreclosure. (FAC, filed January 18, 2010 [Docket #19].)
Subject to the conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. See Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The court's decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should be informed by values of "economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Id. at 1001 (citations omitted). Further, primary responsibility for developing and applying state law rests with the state courts. Therefore, when federal claims are eliminated before trial, district courts should usually decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) ("In the usual case in which federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.") (quoting Schneider v. TRW Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991)). In accordance with Section 1367(c), the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state law claims.
Plaintiff's FAC is therefore DISMISSED without prejudice.*fn3