The opinion of the court was delivered by: Fred Van Sickle Senior United States District Judge
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the "Petition"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Ct. Rec. 1). Petitioner is proceeding pro se. Jesse N. DeWitt, a Deputy Attorney General for the State of California, is representing Respondent.
At the time this Petition was filed, Petitioner was in custody at Kern Valley State Prison pursuant to his May 8, 2003 conviction in the San Joaquin County Superior Court for second-degree murder, robbery and arson. (Ct. Rec. 1). On August 22, 2003, Petitioner began serving an aggregate prison term of 54 years, eight months to life. (Ct. Rec. 1). Petitioner is challenging his conviction based on alleged violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. (Ct. Rec. 1).
Petitioner was convicted for the murder of Adolfine Weiss. (Ct. Rec. 6). Ms. Weiss's badly charred body was found inside the abandoned building where she resided. (Id.) Petitioner, in the course of robbing Ms. Weiss, set fire to both she and the house. (Id.) The medical evidence introduced at trial showed that Ms. Weiss died of ligature strangulation prior to the fire being started. (Id.)
Petitioner was convicted on May 8, 2003,. (Ct. Rec. 6). He appealed his conviction to the Third District Court of Appeal for the State of California. (Ct. Rec. 1). His appeal raised five issues, none of which are currently before this Court. (Ct. Rec. 7, Lodged Doc. B). The Third District affirmed in part and remanded with directions regarding the adjustment of fines. People v. Harmon, No. C044925, 2005 WL 1111759, at *13 (May 11, 2005)(unreported decision). On July 20, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request for review. (Ct. Rec. 7, Lodged Doc. D).
On August 26, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San Joaquin County Superior Court. (Ct. Rec. 7, Lodged Doc. F). This was the first time Petitioner raised the alleged Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations. (Ct. Rec. 7, Lodged Doc. F). On October 11, 2005, the Superior Court denied the petition, holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues should have been raised on direct appeal, and that Petitioner failed to allege his claims with sufficient particularity. (Ct. Rec. 7, Lodged Doc. G). Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Third District Court of Appeal. (Ct. Rec.7, Lodged Doc. H). On November 3, 2005, the Third District summarily denied the petition. (Ct. Rec. 7, Lodged Doc. I). Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. (Ct. Rec. 7, Lodged Doc. J). The California Supreme Court, citing In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756 (1953), denied the petition. (Ct. Rec. 7, Lodged Doc. K).
Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California on November 16, 2006. (Ct. Rec. 1).
Petitioner alleges that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when statements he made to police after requesting counsel were introduced against him at trial. (Ct. Rec. 1.) He also argues that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated when a woman with "negative opinions" about him was left on the jury over his objection. (Ct. Rec. 1.) The State of California (the "State") argues that under California law, these claims are procedurally barred because Petitioner did not raise them on direct review. (Ct. Rec. 6 at 10, 13). According to the State, this procedural bar constitutes an "independent and adequate" state law ground for denying federal review. (Id.)
The principles of federalism and comity dictate that a federal court will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on "independent and adequate" state law grounds. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). "Independent" means the decision is made independent of federal law. Id. "Adequate" means that state law supports the court's decision. See id. If the law relied on by the state court is both independent of federal law and adequate to support its decision, a federal court will deny review. Id.
Applicable to this case is the doctrine of "procedural default." Procedural default occurs when a state court declines to address a prisoner's federal claims because he has failed to meet a state procedural requirement. Id. at 729-30. The United States Supreme Court has held that procedural default constitutes a specific application of the "independent and adequate state ground" doctrine, and acts as a bar to federal review, absent a showing of cause and prejudice. Id. at 730-31; see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). "A state procedural rule constitutes an adequate bar to federal court review if it was firmly established and regularly followed at the time it was applied by the state court, and is considered independent if it is not interwoven with federal law or dependent upon a federal constitutional ruling." Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted). Further, a federal court lacks jurisdiction to review state court applications of state law procedural rules: the federal court's only task is to determine whether the state court decision rests on independent and adequate state law grounds. See Poland v. Stewart, 151 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 1998) However, the Supreme Court has created a "conclusive presumption of [federal] jurisdiction" in habeas cases. Id. at 733. In order to overcome this presumption, the state court must "clearly and expressly [state] that [its decision] is . . . based on bona fide separate, ...