UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
May 7, 2010
GARY T. WONG AND MARIA WONG PLAINTIFFS,
AMERICAN SERVICING COMPANY, INC., LITTON LOAN SERVICING, MERIDIAS CAPITAL, INC., FIRST AMERICAN LOANSTAR TRUSTEE SERVICES, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., MERIDIAS CAPITAL INC. WILLIAM A. ARRIOLA, BRENT HICKS AND DOES 1-20 INCLUSIVE, DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Frank C. Damrell, Jr. United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the motions of Meridias Capital, Inc. ("Meridias"), Brent Hicks ("Hicks"), American Servicing Company, Inc. ("American Servicing"), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), and First American Loanstar Trustee Services ("Loanstar") to dismiss plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(6). On March 23, 2010, plaintiffs Gary T. Wong and Maria Wong (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition, requesting that their claims for violations of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") against the moving defendants be dismissed without prejudice. (Docket #s 60-2, 60-3, 61-2, 61-3.) On April 8, 2010, plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the TILA and RESPA claims against defendant Dyck O'Neal, Inc., who had not yet been served. (Docket #68.)
Based on plaintiffs' filings, the court dismisses the RESPA and TILA claims asserted in the TAC. See, e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a); Swedberg v. Marotzke, 339 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (a defendant's filing of a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b), does not prevent the plaintiffs from later filing a voluntary dismissal).
Dismissal of the RESPA and TILA claims leaves the complaint devoid of any federal claims. The remaining claims are state law claims for violation of the California Rosenthal Act, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful foreclosure.
Subject to the conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. See Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The court's decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should be informed by values of "economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Id. at 1001 (citations omitted). Further, primary responsibility for developing and applying state law rests with the state courts. Therefore, when federal claims are eliminated before trial, district courts should usually decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) ("In the usual case in which federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.") (quoting Schneider v. TRW Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991)). In accordance with Section 1367(c), the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' remaining state law claims.
Plaintiffs' complaint is therefore DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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