The opinion of the court was delivered by: Frank C. Damrell, Jr. United States District Judge
This matter is before the court on the motions of defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., California Reconveyance Corporation, and Impac Funding Corporation to dismiss plaintiff Joanna Smith's ("plaintiff") first amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(6).
Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry before the adjudication of any case before the court. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Without jurisdiction, this court cannot adjudicate the merits of this case or order any relief. See id. ("If the district court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action should have been dismissed, regardless of the parties' preference for an adjudication in federal court.").
Plaintiff's original complaint, filed in the Superior Court for the State of California in and for the County of Sacramento, alleged claims for (1) fraud; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) violation of the California Rosenthal Act, California Civil Code §§ 1788 et seq.; (5) negligence; (6) violation of Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605, et seq.; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; and (8) violation California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.. Defendant Impac Funding Corporation removed the case to the court on Februaru 26, 2010, based on federal question jurisdiction.
However, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on March 5, 2010, which is devoid of any federal claims. Specifically, plaintiff's first amended complaint alleges claims for (1) fraud; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) violation of the California Rosenthal Act, California Civil Code §§ 1788 et seq.; (5) negligence; (6) breach of fiduciary duty; (7) violations of California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; (7) violation of Civil Code § 2923.5 et seq.; and (8) quiet title.
Subject to the conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. See Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). The court's decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should be informed by values of "economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Id. at 1001 (citations omitted). Further, primary responsibility for developing and applying state law rests with the state courts. Therefore, when federal claims are eliminated before trial, district courts should usually decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[I]n the usual case in which federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.") (quoting Schneider v. TRW Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991)). In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims.
Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint is REMANDED to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Sacramento.
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