UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
May 21, 2010
DMITRIY LANIN, PLAINTIFF,
WELLS FARGO BANK NA; MARIN CONVEYANCING CORPORATION; GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC.; CAPITAL ONE, N.A.; AND DOES 1-50, DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Frank C. Damrell, Jr. United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the motions of defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., Marin Conveyancing Corporation, and Capital One, N.A. to dismiss plaintiff Dmitriy Lanin's ("plaintiff") second amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(6).
Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry before the adjudication of any case before the court. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Without jurisdiction, this court cannot adjudicate the merits of this case or order any relief. See id. ("If the district court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action should have been dismissed, regardless of the parties' preference for an adjudication in federal court.").
Plaintiff's original complaint, filed in the Superior Court for the State of California in and for the County of Placer, alleged claims under both state and federal law. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. removed the case on September 1, 2009 on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. On February 19, 2010, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to amend certain claims.
However, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on March 15, 2010, which is devoid of any federal claims. Specifically, plaintiff's first amended complaint alleges claims for (1) negligence; (2) declaratory relief; (3) breach of contract; (4) unfair business practices in violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; (5) unjust enrichment; (6) accounting; (7) promissory estoppel; (8) misrepresentation; (9) breach of fiduciary duties; (10) unconscionability; (11) cancellation of void instrument; (12) recession/cancellation (sic); (13) slander of title; (14) deceit; (15) violation of Civil Code §§ 1916.17 and 1921; and (16) violation of Civil Code § 1572.
Subject to the conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. See Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). The court's decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should be informed by values of "economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Id. at 1001 (citations omitted). Further, primary responsibility for developing and applying state law rests with the state courts. Therefore, when federal claims are eliminated before trial, district courts should usually decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[I]n the usual case in which federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.") (quoting Schneider v. TRW Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991)). In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims.*fn1
Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint is REMANDED to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Placer.
IT IS SO ORDERED.