The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Dana M. Sabraw United States District Judge
ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER [Docket No. 3]
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to prevent Defendants from foreclosing on or selling Plaintiffs' residence. Plaintiffs filed the instant application and a Verified Complaint on May 28, 2010, and served both documents on Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. No party has filed an opposition to the motion.
Plaintiffs state they reside in the property located at 2307 Rock View Glenn, Escondido, California. In 2006, Plaintiffs obtained a loan from Defendants to refinance the property. Plaintiffs allege Defendants did not provide them with the documents and disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), and that the information Defendants did provide was inaccurate or misleading. (Compl. at ¶¶27-28.) Plaintiffs are unable to make the monthly payments on their loan, and are currently facing foreclosure.*fn1 The Complaint alleges the following claims for relief: (1) violation of TILA, (2) violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, (5) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (6) negligence and (7) injunctive relief.
The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo before a preliminary injunction hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed merely to prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974) (noting that a temporary restraining order is restricted to its "underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer"). The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). A party seeking injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 must show either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the moving party's favor. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999); Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1998). "'These two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases.'" Roe, 134 F.3d at 1402 (quoting United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992)); accord Sun Microsystems, 188 F.3d at 1119. "Thus, 'the greater the relative hardship to the moving party, the less probability of success must be shown.'" Sun Microsystems, 188 F.3d at 1119 (quoting National Ctr. for Immigrants Rights v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Here, Plaintiffs have shown a possibility of irreparable harm in the potential loss of their residence. However, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated either "a combination of probable success on the merits" of their claims, nor have they raised any serious questions about the merits of their claims. In the absence thereof, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a temporary restraining order.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order is denied.