The opinion of the court was delivered by: Paul L. Abrams United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed this action on July 16, 2009, seeking review of the Commissioner's denial of his application for Disability Insurance Benefits. The parties filed Consents to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge on August 14, 2009, and August 21, 2009. Pursuant to the Court's order, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation on February 11, 2010, that addresses their positions concerning the disputed issues in the case. The Court has taken the Joint Stipulation under submission without oral argument.
Plaintiff was born on July 9, 1944. [Administrative Record ("AR") at 78.] He completed three years of college [AR at 100], and has past relevant work experience as a director of marketing and sales. [AR at 97.]
On December 29, 2005, plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging that he has been unable to work since June 1, 2002, due to attention deficit disorder ("ADD") and high blood pressure. [AR at 78, 96.] After his application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). [AR at 48-52, 55-59, 61-62.] A hearing was held on January 7, 2008, at which plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified on his own behalf. [AR at 20-45.] Plaintiff's wife, Martha Petite, also testified at the hearing. [AR at 36-44.] On February 13, 2008, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled. [AR at 11-19.] When the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on April 30, 2009, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. [AR at 3-5.] This action followed.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has authority to review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based upon the application of improper legal standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992).
In this context, the term "substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance -- it is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion." Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; see also Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. When determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner's decision, the Court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257; Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Court must defer to the decision of the Commissioner. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1258.
IV. EVALUATION OF DISABILITY
Persons are "disabled" for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.
A. THE FIVE-STEP EVALUATION PROCESS
The Commissioner (or ALJ) follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in assessing whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995, as amended Apr. 9, 1996). In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b); Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5. If the claimant is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting his ability to do basic work activities; if not, a finding of non-disability is made and the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5. If the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments ("Listing") set forth at 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d); Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5. If the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity ("RFC")*fn1 to perform his past work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e); Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5. The claimant has the burden of proving that he is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets this burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. Id. The Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is not disabled because he can perform other substantial gainful work available in the national economy. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). The determination of this issue comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g); Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.
B. THE ALJ'S APPLICATION OF THE FIVE-STEP PROCESS
In this case, at step one, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff has not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of the disability.*fn2 [AR at 13.] At step two, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff has a "questionable severe impairment from an anxiety like disorder." [Id.] At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's impairment does not meet or equal any of the impairments in the Listing. [Id.] The ALJ further found that plaintiff retained the RFC "to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels" with the limitations that such work be unskilled, entry level, and object oriented. [AR at 14.] At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is unable to perform his past relevant work. [AR at 17-18.] At step five, using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework, the ALJ concluded that there are "jobs that exist in significant numbers in the ...