The opinion of the court was delivered by: Andrew J. Guilford United States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WRIGHT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, GRANTING DEFENDANT BYERS' MOTION TO DISMISS, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
In this trademark case, Plaintiffs Peak Performance Nutrition ("Peak") and William E. Wheeler, Ph.D. ("Wheeler") (collectively "Plaintiffs") allege that Defendants Media Power, Inc. ("Media Power"), Kenneth W. Byers ("Byers"), and Ken Wright ("Wright") (collectively, "Defendants") infringed trade and service marks in the nutritional supplement field. Defendant Byers moves to dismiss, or in the alternative to transfer venue, ("Byers' Motion") under Federal Rules of Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(4). (Docket Entry 16.) Defendant Wright moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim ("Wright's Motion") under Rule 12(b)(6). (Docket Entry 29.) Plaintiffs move for evidentiary and monetary sanctions on Defendants Media Power and Byers ("Plaintiffs' Motion"). (Docket Entry 59.)
After considering all papers and arguments submitted, Byers' Motion is GRANTED, Wright's Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED.
The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs' Complaint, and for the purpose of Wright's Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court accepts them as true.
Wheeler is a "renowned nutritionist and nutritional supplement formulator." (Compl. ¶ 10.) He advised professional athletes about dietary supplements. (Compl. ¶ 11.) In 2002, Wright and Wheeler agreed that Wright would pay royalties to Wheeler for a nutritional shake Wheeler developed. (Compl. ¶ 16.) In 2004, Wright and Byers entered into an agreement to market the shake using Wheeler's name. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Defendants used Wheeler's name on various product labels and websites, but did not get Wheeler's permission first. (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 24.)
Based on these facts and others, Plaintiffs filed this trademark infringement case on July 9, 2009. The Complaint asserts six claims, numbered as follows: (1) false advertisement; (2) trademark infringement; (3) misappropriation of right of publicity; (4) defamation and false light; (5) misappropriation of trade secrets; and (6) unfair competition.
Defendants filed their motions to dismiss before the late Judge Florence-Marie Cooper. Judge Cooper ordered discovery on the personal jurisdiction issues. The case was later transferred to this Court. After multiple continuances, and only three court days before the Motions were set to be heard, Plaintiffs filed last minute amended oppositions and their Motion for sanctions. This Court once again continued the hearings on the Motions to dismiss, and set a briefing schedule for the Plaintiffs' Motion for sanctions. The Court now considers all pending motions.
1. DEFENDANT WRIGHT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Plaintiffs' fourth claim is for defamation and false light. Defendant Wright moves to dismiss this claim under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6).
Acourt should dismiss a complaint when its allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint need only include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "'[D]etailed factual allegations' are not required." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (May 18, 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). The Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations, construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1993).
But the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1940 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A court should not accept "threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements," Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1940, or "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences," Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that the deficiencies of the complaint could not possibly be cured by amendment. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 2003).
To state a claim for defamation, Plaintiffs must allege "(a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage." 5 Witkin 10th Torts § 529 (2005). There can be no defamation without a falsehood. Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 97 Cal. App. 4th 798, 809 (2002). In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that "various websites registered by Media Power and/or Byers" used Wheelers's name and credentials to promote products that Wheeler did not approve. (Compl. ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs allege that various letters and articles were falsely attributed to Wheeler on these websites, and that this false attribution harms Wheeler's reputation. (Compl. ¶ 41.) But Plaintiffs do not point to any publication or republication by Defendant Wright. The only allegation that could possibly refer to Defendant Wright is that "Defendants tacitly or expressly agreed to the publication of the defamatory advertisements, and acted in ...