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GMAC Mortgage LLC v. Chavers

June 22, 2010

GMAC MORTGAGE LLC
v.
LINDA M. CHAVERS ET AL.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: The Honorable Otis D. Wright II, United States District Judge

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Raymond Neal Not reported

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.

Proceedings (In Chambers): ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF GMAC MORTGAGE LLC'S MOTION FOR REMAND [4, 6]

Before the Court is Plaintiff GMAC Mortgage, LLC's (formerly known as GMAC Mortgage Corp.) ("Plaintiff") motion for remand. (Docket Nos. 4, 6.) The motion is made on the basis that the facts alleged in the complaint do not support a finding of federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After careful consideration of the parties' papers, the motion is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this unlawful detainer action by filing a complaint against Defendant Linda M. Chavers ("Defendant"), the former owner of the property at issue in this action, on February 3, 2010 in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Mot. 2.) The complaint alleges the following:

Plaintiff is the current owner of the subject real property located at 1226 Westcove Place, West Covina, California 91790 (the "Premises"). Plaintiff obtained title to, and right to possession of, the Premises by its purchase of the same at a foreclosure sale. Defendant Chavers, the former owner of the Premises, executed as Trustor a Deed of Trust, with power of sale, recorded on or about March 23, 2006 in the Official Records of Los Angeles County, which Deed of Trust encumbered the Premises. Pursuant to the foreclosure and sale of the Premises, under the power of sale contained in the Deed of Trust, Plaintiff purchased the Premises at a Trustee's Sale held on or about January 12, 2010. Pursuant to the Trustees' Sale, the title of the Premises has been duly perfected in Plaintiff's name.

Plaintiff further alleges that thereafter, Defendant Chavers remained in possession of the Premises. On or about January 20, 2010, Plaintiff served on Defendant a written Notice to Quit and Notice to Vacate (collectively, "Notices"). Despite the expiration of the Notices, Defendant refused to surrender possession of the Premises.

Based on the above allegations, Plaintiff filed the instant unlawful detainer complaint for a post-foreclosure eviction. Defendant timely removed. In response, Plaintiff filed the instant motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to federal court pursuant to the federal removal statute, based on either federal question or diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. "The removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of remand." Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airline, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). The presumption against removal means that "the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper."

Moreover, the district court must remand any case previously removed from a state court "if at any time before final judgment it appears that the district ...


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