The opinion of the court was delivered by: Morrison C. England, Jr. United States District Judge
Joseph Edward Marty, who styles himself as the "Libellant" in these proceedings, moves for a temporary restraining order on grounds that he has obtained "a fully cured and perfected Admiralty Counterclaim" against "Libellees" who appear to be various officials employed by El Dorado County and the El Dorado County Court.
While Marty's submission to the Court is all but incomprehensible, it appears to relate a claimed criminal conspiracy related to the alleged "kidnapping" of Marty's granddaughter.*fn1 Marty alleges that the Superior Court has "been acting as a private commercial fictional court of consent" and seeks permanent injunction preventing both the Court and County from "continuing any hostile presentments and criminal conspiracy and racketeering activities against Libellant and his family." It also seeks orders dismissing, voiding, expunging and vacating court and public records involving some twenty different individuals and/or cases. Moreover, Marty's action seeks a writ of execution for damages allegedly totaling some 500 billion dollars, and Marty further seeks an order compelling the El Dorado County Recorder to record all maritime liens, commercial liens, and all other documents allegedly executed in his favor into the public record.
First, as a procedural matter, Marty has not complied with the provisions of Eastern District Local Rule 231 in seeking a temporary restraining order. While Marty has filed a TRO Checklist and purports to have included both an Affidavit detailing his efforts to provide notice, as required by Rule 231(c)(5), and an Affidavit in support of the existence of an irreparable injury pursuant to subsection (c)(4), no such Affidavits has been presented to the Court. Nor has a separate Complaint been filed, or any proposed order with provision for bond. Marty's request for temporary restraining order fails given those procedural shortcomings alone.
Second, in order to qualify for injunctive relief, Marty must, at minimum, demonstrate a "fair chance of success" that his claims will ultimately prevail on their merits. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calif. State Bd. Of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995). This means that Marty must demonstrate some likelihood of obtaining a favorable result in her case in chief. Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F.Supp. 1031, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1986); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1005, fn. 3 (9th Cir. 2001). No matter how severe or irreparable the injury asserted, an injunction should never issue if the moving party's claims are so legally untenable that there is virtually no chance of prevailing on the merits. State of Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A. 518 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1975).
The inherent implausibility of the claims asserted by Marty makes it impossible for this Court to conclude there is any likelihood she will ultimately prevail.
Consequently the requested temporary restraining order cannot issue on that basis as well.
Given all the foregoing, Marty's Motion for Emergency Injunction is DENIED.