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Popov v. Martel

July 26, 2010

VASILIY POPOV, PETITIONER,
v.
M. MARTEL, RESPONDENT.



ORDER

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his Placer County convictions for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, among other things. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition is not timely and contains unexhausted claims. The court will not address the exhaustion question because it finds the petition is not timely.

I. Background

On June 29, 2006, petitioner was sentenced to a total term of sixteen years, four months to life. Lodged Document (Lodg. Doc.) No. 1. He did not appeal his conviction, but rather filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on May 14, 2007.*fn2 Lodg. Doc. No. 2. This petition was denied on September 25, 2007. Lodg. Doc. No. 3.

The instant petition was filed on May 10, 2009.

II. The Statute of Limitations

A. Statutory Tolling

One of the changes the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) made to the habeas statutes was to add a statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post- conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted ...


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