The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. United States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE*fn1
This order addresses three pending motions: Defendants U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for the C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-CB8 ("U.S. Bank") and Litton Loan Servicing's ("Litton Loan") motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' third amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6); Defendant Argent Mortgage Company, LLC's ("Argent") Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss; and Argent's motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs' third amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(f). Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the dismissal motions. For the following reasons, Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted, and Argent's motion to strike is denied.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
Argent was the original lender for the residential mortgage on Plaintiffs' property located at 1557 Sophie Lane, Escalon in San Joaquin County, California. (Third Amended Compl. ("TAC") ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs do not allege the date on which the loan was consumated.
Plaintiffs allege the following four claims: (1) violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, et seq. ("TILA"); (2) violation of the California Rosenthal Act, California Civil Code sections 1788, et seq.; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) an unfair competition in violation of California Business and Professions Code section 17200.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion "challenges a complaint's compliance with . . . pleading requirements." Champlaie v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2009 WL 3429622, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2009). A pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the [plaintiff's] claim is and the grounds upon which relief rests . . . ." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Further, "[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must allege "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Plausibility, however, requires more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Under Rule 12(f) a court may strike from a pleading "an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "Immaterial matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief" while "impertinent matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question." Boles v. Merscorp, Inc., 2009 WL 734135, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2009).