UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 3, 2010
APPLIED PROFESSIONAL TRAINING, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF,
EARLY MIRA COSTA COLLEGE, ENTITY UNKNOWN, DISCOVERY TELESKILLS, LLC, DBA AMERI-SKILLS, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION; BURT PRICE, AN INDIVIDUAL; THOMAS CAWLEY, AN INDIVIDUAL; XAVIER URIBE, AN INDIVIDUAL; MARA GLENN, AN INDIVIDUAL; JANIS AYDELOTT, AN INDIVIDUAL, AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50, INCLUSIVE, DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Louisa S Porter United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, AND DENYING, IN PART, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONDUCT [Doc. 9]
On August 31, 2010, without first calling the Court for a hearing date,*fn1 Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery to Oppose Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 9.] Specifically, Plaintiff seeks discovery of the following: (1) "[t]he educational materials used by Defendants before and after the date of the Release;" (2) "[a]ll students contacted by Defendants after the date of the Release;" and (3) "[t]he representations made by, and conduct of, Defendants leading up to the Release." (Mot. for Disc. at 5-6.) On September 1, 2010, Defendants filed an Opposition to the motion. [Doc. 10.] The Court has reviewed the motion for discovery, the parties' points and authorities, the Complaint [Doc. 1], and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 7]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, Plaintiff's motion to conduct early discovery.
"A district court is vested with broad discretion to permit or deny discovery," which extends to jurisdictional discovery. Laub v. U. S. Dept. of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir.2003). Specifically, "discovery should ordinarily be granted where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary." Id. (internal quotations omitted). In the present case, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)("lack of subject matter jurisdiction"), asserting that both the federal copyright claim and four state law claims "are forever barred by the Release executed by [the parties] in June 2009." (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 13.) In response, Plaintiff filed the motion for early discovery in order to explore the "factual issues contesting this Court's jurisdiction." (Mot. for Disc. at 6.) Based on a review of the pleadings and relevant exhibits, the Court finds that "a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary" to enable adequate opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Laub, 342 F.3d at 1093.
However, discovery sought before the parties have met and conferred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) is limited. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Thus, Plaintiff's motion for discovery is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, and the Court limits the discovery as follows:
(1) Plaintiff's motion to compel production of "[t]he educational materials used by Defendants before and after the date of the Release" is GRANTED. It is hereby ORDERED that Defendants shall produce these materials within one week of the date of this Order.
(2) Plaintiff's motion to compel production of the identities of "[a]ll students contacted by Defendants after the date of the Release" is GRANTED. It is hereby ORDERED that Defendants shall produce the name and address of each contacted student within one week of the date of this Order.
(3) Plaintiff's motion to compel production of "[t]he representations made by, and conduct of, Defendants leading up to the Release" is DENIED as vague and overbroad.
If the parties seek to modify dates related to the pending Motion to Dismiss, the parties shall contact the chambers of the Honorable Dana M. Sabraw.
IT IS SO ORDERED.