The opinion of the court was delivered by: Frank C. Damrell, Jr. United States District Judge
This matter is before the court on plaintiff Columbus Life Insurance Company's ("plaintiff" or "Columbus") motions for order granting discharge in interpleader and for attorneys' fees and costs. None of the defendants oppose plaintiff's motion for discharge. Defendants Gavin Hill, Holly Looman, Kyle Hill, and Katrina Clemons do not oppose plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs, but defendant Kristan Hill-Love ("Hill-Love") objects to the award of any attorneys' fees or costs from the interpleaded funds. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth below,*fn1 plaintiff's motion for order granting discharge is GRANTED, and plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff issued a life insurance policy (the "Policy") to the late Garla Quarnberg ("Quarnberg"), dated November 16, 1994, with a death benefit of $50,000. (Compl. In Interpleader ("Compl."), filed Apr. 6, 2009, ¶ 9.) The original named beneficiary of the Policy was Quarnberg's husband, Max Quarnberg, who died on or about October 12, 2005, and the original contingent beneficiaries were "all surviving children equally." (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) Subsequently, plaintiff received a change of beneficiary form, dated November 3, 2005, which listed "Kristan L. Love" as the sole beneficiary and "Myranda & Savannah Love" as the sole contingent beneficiaries. (Id. ¶ 12.) Quarnberg died on or about June 30, 2008, and the death benefits became payable under the Policy. (Id. ¶ 13.)
By telephone call made on July 16, 2008, and fax sent on July 17, 2008, defendant Gavin Hill made a claim to plaintiff for the death benefit proceeds of the Policy. (Id. ¶ 14.) Specifically, he contended that defendant Hill-Love had committed "personal credit, medical, and life insurance" fraud. (Id.) On or about August 21, 2008, defendant Hill-Love also made a claim to the death benefit proceeds of the Policy as the primary beneficiary. (Id. ¶ 15.)
On April 6, 2009, because of the potentially conflicting claims to the death benefit proceeds under the Policy, plaintiff filed a Complaint in Interpleader pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a). Plaintiff deposited the sum of $51,517.81, representing the amount due under the Policy plus interest, with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. (Id. ¶ 16.)
"Generally, courts have discretion to award attorney fees to a disinterested stakeholder in an interpleader action." Abex Corp. v. Ski's Enter., Inc., 748 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Gelfgren v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 79, 81 (9th Cir. 1982)). "The amount of fees to be awarded in an interpleader action is committed to the sound discretion of the district court." Trustees of the Directors Guild of Am.-Producer Pension Benefits Plan v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir. 2000). The availability of such fees "recognizes that by bringing the action, the plaintiff benefits all parties 'by promoting early litigation on the ownership of the fund, thus preventing dissipation.'" Id. (quoting Schirmer Stevedoring Co. v. Seaboard Stevedoring Corp., 306 F.2d 188, 194 (9th Cir. 1962)).
"Because the interpleader plaintiff is supposed to be disinterested in the ultimate disposition of the fund, attorneys' fee awards are properly limited to those fees that are incurred in filing the action and pursuing the plan's release from liability." Id. Due to this limitation, "attorneys' fees to the 'distinterested interpleader plaintiff are typically modest."
Id. Indeed, "there is an important policy interest in seeing that the fee award does not deplete the fund at the expense of the party who is ultimately deemed entitled to it." Id.
In this case, plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of approximately $14,918.00 from the interpleaded fund of $51,517.81. The court concludes that this amount is unreasonable, both with respect to the rate charged and the hours expended, and well exceeds the "modest" amount of attorneys' fees contemplated in an interpleader action.
In order to decide what rate is "reasonable," courts look at "prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992) (a reasonable hourly rate should be determined "by reference to the fees that private attorneys of an ability and reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel charge their paying clients for legal work of similar complexity"). Determination of a reasonable hourly rate is not made merely by reference to rates actually charged by the prevailing party. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). Rather, the rate assessed is based on the prevailing rate in the relevant community for similar work. Id. at 1211; Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11.
Generally, the relevant community is the forum in which the district court sits. Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991). However, rates outside the forum may be used "if local counsel was unavailable, either because they are unwilling or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization ...