The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Irma E. Gonzalez, Chief Judge United States District Court
ORDER: (1) DISMISSING CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS FROM PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE OF THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) & 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
On February 4, 2010, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") and simultaneously dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b). See March 19, 2010 Order at 8-9. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court's Order. Id. at 9. Plaintiff filed an extension of time to file his Amended Complaint which was granted by the Court. See May 12, 2010 Order at 3. On May 13, 2010, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint ("FAC") [Doc. No. 6].
However, once again, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See June 4, 2010 Order at 6-7. On July 12, 2010, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel. The Court again denied his Motion for Appointment of Counsel and dismissed his Second Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim. See July 27, 2010 Order at 6-7. Although untimely, the Court permitted Plaintiff to file a Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") on September 16, 2010.
III. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28U.S.C.§§1915(e)(2)&1915A(b)
As the Court stated in its previous Orders, the Prison Litigation Reform Act's ("PLRA") amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as soon as practicable after docketing." See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).
To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct he complains of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that conduct violated a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
B. Claims Surviving Screening
After reviewing Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims of retaliation against Aguilar, D.R. Gonzalez and E. Delgado survive the Court's required sua sponte screening process. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to U.S. Marshal service on his behalf as to these Defendants. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) ("The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases."); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) ("[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal ... if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915."). Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that "the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring." Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
All the remaining claims against the remaining Defendants are DISMISSED from this action for the reasons set forth below.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants removed property from his cell that hampered his ability to pursue his claims in Imperial County Superior Court. Prisoners do "have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress of their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts." O'Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, the Supreme Court held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons who are trained in the law." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). To establish a violation of the right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1) a non-frivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An "actual injury" is defined as "actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim." Id. at 348; see also Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to alleged any actions with any particularity that have precluded his pursuit of a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either a criminal conviction or sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (right to access to the courts protects only an inmate's need and ability to "attack [his] sentence, directly or collaterally, and ... to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement."); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (the non-frivolous nature of the "underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts ...