UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
November 2, 2010
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
MARIA GABRIELA HASHEMIPOUR, AKA "MARIA GABRIELA PEREZ," AKA "MARIA GABRIELLA PEREZ," AKA "GABRIELLA PEREZ RUSTICHELLI," AKA "MARIA DE JESUS GONZALEZ PEREZ," DBA "CHEZ GABRIELA STUDIO," DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Manuel Real United States District Judge
FINDINGS AND ORDER RE: SPEEDY TRIAL ACT AND EXCLUDABLE TIME
Defendant Maria Gabriela Hashemipour, also known as ("aka") "Maria Gabriela Perez," aka "Maria Gabriella Perez," aka "Gabriella Perez Rustichelli," aka "Maria De Jesus Gonzalez Perez," doing business as "Chez Gabriela Studio" ("defendant") first appeared before a judicial officer in the court in which this charge is pending on August 19, 2010. The indictment in this case was filed on October 20, 2010. Pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., trial in this matter was to commence on or before December 29, 2010.
On October 25, 2010, defendant appeared before the Court for a trial setting. The Court initially intended to set trial in this matter for on or about November 30, 2010. Upon the request of defendant and stipulation by the government, the Court instead set trial in this matter for January 11, 2011, at 9:00 a.m.
This Court finds that the ends of justice served by setting the trial date on January 11, 2011, outweigh the interest of the public and defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. For purposes of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period from November 30, 2010, to January 11, 2011, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B), because it results from delay resulting from a continuance granted by the Court at the request of the parties on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. The time should also be deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) specifically because the delay is necessary to permit defendant reasonable time necessary for effective preparation of a defense, specifically requesting and reviewing additional evidence, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Court deems the period from November 30, 2010, through January 11, 2011, inclusive, an excludable period under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.
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