ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Yvette M. Palazuelos, Judge. Petition granted with directions. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC419835).
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Manella, J.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
In real party in interest Alan D. Liker's action to recover his fees under his service contracts with petitioners, the trial court denied petitioners' motion for summary adjudication. Petitioners seek a writ directing the trial court to vacate the denial of summary adjudication and to enter a new order granting the motion. We grant the petition for writ of mandate.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
There are no material disputes regarding the following facts: Liker is an attorney who specializes in taxation matters and complex business transactions. In December 2005, Liker entered into a service agreement with petitioners Dawn Arnall and Ameriquest Mortgage Company (Ameriquest agreement). The agreement obliged Liker to provide advisory services aimed at minimizing "the adverse economic impact" arising from specified taxable income. Under the fee provisions, Liker was to receive a stipend of $20,000 per month for nine months, and a "[s]uccess [f]ee" amounting to two percent of specified reductions in "adverse economic impact" and other "economic savings." In January 2007, the parties modified the Ameriquest agreement. As modified, the agreement acknowledged that Liker had provided services after the original nine-month period; extended the agreement's effective period to December 31, 2009; and permitted Ameriquest and Arnall to end Liker's monthly stipend when he became entitled to a $2 million success fee.
In March 2007, Liker entered into a second service agreement with Arnall and petitioner RoDa Drilling, L.P. (RoDa agreement).*fn1 Under the agreement, Liker was to provide advisory services in connection with certain oil and gas investments. The agreement provided that Liker was to receive a $20,000 monthly stipend until December 31, 2009 (subject to conditions not relevant here), and a success fee amounting to one percent of specified recoveries and sales proceeds.
In June 2009, petitioners terminated Liker's services and averred that the service agreements were void under Business and Professions Code section 6147.*fn2 On January 28, 2010, Liker filed his first amended complaint against petitioners, asserting a claim for breach of the RoDa agreement, and claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, recovery in quantum meruit, and declaratory relief regarding the Ameriquest and RoDa agreements. The complaint alleged that when Liker requested his success fees under the agreements, petitioners improperly contended that the agreements were void.
Petitioners sought summary adjudication on Liker's claims, with the exception of his claims for recovery in quantum meruit. They maintained that the agreements were void under section 6147 for want of a statutorily required statement, namely, that the success fees were "not set by law but [were] negotiable between attorney and client" (§ 6147, subd. (a)(4)). In denying summary adjudication, the trial court relied on Franklin v. Appel (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 875, 892 (Franklin), in which the appellate court concluded that the then-effective version of section 6147 was inapplicable to "contingency fee agreements outside the litigation context." On June 23, 2010, petitioners filed their petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief. We issued an alternative writ of mandate and temporary stay on September 1, 2010.
Petitioners contend that the trial court erred in denying summary adjudication. We agree.
"An order denying a motion for summary adjudication may be reviewed by way of a petition for writ of mandate. [Citation.] Where the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment will result in trial on non-actionable claims, a writ of mandate will issue. [Citations.] Likewise, a writ of mandate may issue to prevent trial of non-actionable claims after the erroneous denial of a motion for summary adjudication. [¶] Since a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication 'involves pure matters of law,' we review a ruling on the motion de novo to determine whether the moving and opposing papers show a triable issue of material fact. [Citations.] Thus, the appellate court need not defer to the trial court's decision. '"We are not bound by the trial court's stated reasons, if any, supporting its ruling; we review the ruling, not its rationale."' [Citations.]" (Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1450, fn. omitted.)
As the material facts are undisputed, the key issues before us concern the application of section 6147. To the extent we must construe section 6147 and related provisions, established principles guide our inquiry. "The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. To accomplish that objective, courts must look first to the words of the statute, giving effect to their plain meaning." (In re Jerry R. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1437.) However, "the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible. [Citation.]" (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) In addition, "[b]oth the legislative history of the statute and ...