The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Dana M. SABRAWUnited States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This case comes before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, and Defendant filed a reply. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the motion.
BACKGROUND This case is one of six class action cases against Americredit currently pending in the state and federal courts of California. In each case, Defendant repossessed the plaintiff's vehicle, and sent the plaintiff a statutory notice regarding the repossession. In each case, the plaintiff alleges the notice did not comply with the Rees Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act ("Rees-Levering").
In this case, Plaintiff Ronald Wright purchased a used 1999 Mercedes-Benz from a car dealership in Oceanside, California. (First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶ 6.) The dealership arranged financing for the purchase of the vehicle, and assigned the sales contract to Americredit. (Id.)
In January 2010, Americredit repossessed Plaintiff's vehicle. (FAC ¶ 7.) On January 26, 2010, Americredit sent Plaintiff a statutory notice about the repossession. (Id., FAC, Ex. B.)
On April 29, 2010, Plaintiff filed the present case, and on August 6, 2010, Plaintiff filed the FAC. The FAC alleges claims for violation of Rees-Levering, violation of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") and declaratory relief. The present motion followed.
DISCUSSION Defendant moves to dismiss the FAC in its entirety. It argues the statutory notice at issue in the case ("NOI") complies with Rees-Levering, and absent a violation of Rees-Levering, Plaintiff's other claims fail.
In two recent opinions, the Supreme Court established a more stringent standard of review for 12(b)(6) motions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss under this new standard, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007)). In Iqbal, the Court began this task "by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 1951. It then considered "the factual ...