The opinion of the court was delivered by: Frank C. Damrell, Jr. United States District Judge
This matter is before the court on the motion of defendant BAC Home Loans Servicing LP ("BAC") to dismiss plaintiff Arvin Prasad's ("plaintiff") First Amended Complaint ("FAC") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below,*fn1 defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Plaintiff brought this action against BAC for conduct arising out of a Home Affordable Modification Trial Period Plan (the "Plan") that BAC sent plaintiff on or about July 6, 2009. (FAC, filed Sept. 29, 2010 [Docket # 9], ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to the Plan, BAC agreed to modify plaintiff's loan on his property located at 366 Silk Oak Drive, Suisun, California. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims the terms of the Plan state that if he met all the requirements listed, BAC was obligated to provide him with a modification of his current mortgage loan. (Id. ¶ 14.) He alleges that on or about July 22, 2009, he met the terms of the Plan by sending "(1) two copies of the [Plan], (2) an affidavit that explains the reason of [p]laintiff's hardship, (3) a signed and dated copy of [p]laintiff's IRS form 4506T, document[ing]  [p]laintiff's income"; and (4) plaintiff's "first monthly payment of $1,789.00." (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff alleges that despite meeting the terms, BAC is now "attempting to deny that the [Plan] [is] a binding document that requires  [d]efendants to issue the permanent [m]odification agreement." (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges the "true intent of [d]efendants  is to take advantage of [p]laintiff by fraudulently inducing him to make payments in a disguised 'catch up payment plan.'" (Id. ¶ 13.) While his home is currently not in foreclosure, plaintiff asserts he has been "living in limbo without assurances that his home will not be foreclosed, despite his compliance with the Plan's requirements and his payments under [the Plan]." (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff's FAC sets forth five causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) promissory estoppel; (4) unfair business practices in violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, California Business & Professions Code Sections 17200 et seq.; and (5) fraudulent business practices in violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, California Business & Professions Code Sections 17200 et seq..
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). "This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege "'specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Nevertheless, the court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff "can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff has failed to "nudge [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 1952. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 1949. This plausibility inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950.
In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
Plaintiff's first claim for relief alleges that defendant BAC breached the terms of the Plan. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he performed the terms and conditions of the contract by providing the requested documents and making three successive payments of $1,798 which "was a clear and unambiguous performance of an unilateral contract." Plaintiff alleges that despite this BAC "refused to grant the permanent loan modification." (FAC ¶¶ 21-23.) BAC moves to dismiss the claim arguing that a plain reading of ...