The opinion of the court was delivered by: Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge United States District Court
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT STEWART TITLE OF CALIFORNIA'S MOTION TO DISMISS DECISION ONE
On October 6, 2010, Plaintiffs Jeremy P. Monahan and Candy D. Monahan brought this action against Defendants Decision One Mortgage, Stewart Title of California ("Stewart Title"), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (Doc. No. 1.) On December 16, 2010, Defendant Stewart Title filed its motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 15.) On January 21, 2011, the Court submitted the motion on the papers. (Doc. No. 18.) To this date, Plaintiffs have not yet filed an opposition. After due consideration, the Court GRANTS Defendant Stewart Title's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs own real property located at 10535 Dabney Drive, San Diego, CA 92126 (the "Property"). (Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs entered into a loan repayment and security agreement on or about September 18, 2006 with Defendant Decision One Mortgage Company ("Decision One"). (Id. ¶ 3.) Under this agreement, Plaintiffs were to repay a loan of $600,000 to Decision One.*fn1 (Id. ¶ 20.) The note was secured by a First Trust Deed on the Property. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Stewart Title is the original escrow/title company for the loan. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to perform the proper due diligence when qualifying them for the loan. (Compl. ¶ 22.) First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants did not make the terms of the loan, such as the high income to liability ratio, clear and conspicuous. (Id. ¶ 23.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants qualified them for a loan based on their credit scores and stated income, and failed to use more accurate documentation such as tax forms. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants sold them a deceptive loan product which they knew Plaintiffs would be unable to fully pay back. (Id.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants committed various violations during the handling and processing of their loan. (Id. ¶¶ 30-38.)
These violations form the basis for Plaintiffs' causes of action for: (1) declaratory relief; (2) injunctive relief; (3) claim to determine the validity of a lien under Cal. Comm. Code § 9313; (4) contractual breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) violation of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq.; (6) violation of RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.; (7) violation of Cal. Civ. Code §2932.5; (8) rescission; (9) fraud; (10) unfair and deceptive business act practices; (11) breach of fiduciary duty; (12) unconscionability; (13) violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; and (14) quiet title. (Compl.)
I. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The function of this pleading requirement is to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. A complaint does not "suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235--36 (3d ed. 2004)). "All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. However, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. ("TILA"). (Compl. ¶¶ 61-72.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with "accurate material disclosures required under TILA." (Id. ¶ 63.) Plaintiffs allege that the original mortgage lender failed to provide Plaintiffs with a correct payment schedule and accurate interest rate. (Id. ¶ 65.) Plaintiffs further allege that they are entitled to damages, restitution and disgorgement of profits. (Id. ¶¶ 70-71.) Plaintiffs also seek to rescind the loan. (Id. ¶¶ 90-94.)
TILA seeks to protect credit consumers by mandating "meaningful disclosure of credit terms." 15 U.S.C. §1601(a). A request for any damages under TILA is subject to a one year statute of limitations, typically running from the date of the occurrence of the violation. 15 U.S.C. §1640(e). The doctrine of equitable tolling extends the statutory period only where, "despite all due diligence, a plaintiff is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim." Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir.2000). Equitable tolling "focuses on whether there was excusable delay by the plaintiff," and "does not depend on any wrongful conduct by the defendant to prevent the plaintiff from suing." Id. The Ninth Circuit has held equitable tolling of civil damages claims brought under TILA may be appropriate "in certain circumstances," such as when a borrower might not have had a reasonable opportunity to discover the nondisclosures at the time of loan consummation. King v. State of California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts then have discretion to "adjust the limitations period accordingly." Id.
Plaintiffs obtained their loan on September 18, 2006, but did not file this action until more than four years later, on October 6, 2010. Because Plaintiffs brought their TILA damages claim more than one year after the date of the occurrence of the alleged violation, the claim is time-barred. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to suggest that the claim is timely or that equitable tolling is appropriate. Plaintiffs' complaint fails to show that they were denied any "vital information bearing on the existence" of their TILA claim. See Santa Maria, 202 F.3d at 1178. Additionally, Plaintiffs do not offer any allegations indicating that they acted with "due diligence" or with "excusable delay" in bringing this action four years after the loan transaction. Id.; see also O'Connor v. Boeing N Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2002) (a plaintiff ...