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Deborah Solan v. Everhome Mortgage Company

February 3, 2011

DEBORAH SOLAN,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
EVERHOME MORTGAGE COMPANY, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge United States District Court

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

On November 4, 2011, Plaintiff Deborah Solan ("Solan") filed a complaint alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., and the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1602, et seq. (Doc. No. 1, "Compl.") On December 20, 2010, Defendant Everhome Mortgage Company ("Everhome Mortgage") filed its motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 4.) On January 17, 2011, Plaintiff Deborah Solan ("Solan") filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 5.) On January 24, 2011, Defendant Everhome Mortgage filed its reply to the opposition. (Doc. No. 7.) The Court submitted the motion on the papers on January 21, 2011. (Doc. No. 6.) After due consideration the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Solan owns real property located at 6547 Bell Bluff Avenue, San Diego, California ("the Property"). (Compl. ¶ 3.) On or about November 4, 2003, Plaintiff entered into a mortgage loan on the Property with non-party MIT lending for the amount of $192,000. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Everhome Mortgage is the servicer on this loan. (Id. ¶ 4.)

On July 7, 2010, a Notice of Default was entered against the property. (Id. ¶ 8.) On August 12, 2010, Plaintiff Solan alleges she filed a Qualified Written Request ("QWR") with Everhome, seeking information on the identity of the owner of her promissory note and the identity of the master servicer on the obligation, along with a copy of the promissory note. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff alleges that Everhome Mortgage received the request on August 16, 2010 via certified mail. (Id. ¶ 16.) On September 3, 2010, Everhome Mortgage responded to the request. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that the response failed to identify the owner or the master servicer of her promissory note. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that she is unable to seek modification of the terms and conditions of her mortgage because she does not know the identify of the owner of her loan. (Id. ¶ 26.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The function of this pleading requirement is to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. A complaint does not "suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235--36 (3d ed. 2004)). "All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. However, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

II. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant request that the Court take judicial notice of the following notice: (1) Deed of Trust, dated November 2, 2003 (Exhibit 1); (2) Assignment of Deed of Trust, dated June 30, 2010 (Exhibit 2); (3) Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust, dated July 2, 2010 (Exhibit 3); (4) Substitution of Trustee, dated August 6, 2010 (Exhibit 4); and (5) Notice of Trustee's Sale, dated October 12, 2010 (Exhibit 5). (Doc. No. 4-2.)

As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court may consider matters properly subject to judicial notice. Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). Under the Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. Because Defendant requests judicial notice of publicly recorded documents, the Court grants the request and takes judicial notice of the documents.

III. TILA 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2) Claim

Plaintiff's first cause of action is for violation of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2). (Compl. ¶¶ 28-33.) Section 1641(f)(2) states that "[u]pon written request by the obligor, the servicer shall provide the obligor, to the best knowledge of the servicer, with the name, address, and telephone number of the owner of the obligation or the master servicer of the obligation." 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2). Section 1640(a) provides for civil liability for violations of section 1641. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).

Plaintiff alleges that she sent a written request to Defendant Everhome Mortgage to identify of the owner and master servicer of her loan. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff acknowledges that she received a response back. (Id. ¶ 19.) Defendant argues that it did provide Plaintiff with the owner of her loan because Defendant itself is the owner of the loan. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 4.) Accordingly, after due consideration of the ...


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