The opinion of the court was delivered by: Morrison C. England, Jr. United States District Judge
Plaintiffs Charles and Lucille Jackson ("Plaintiffs") seek redress from Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC ("Defendant") based on claims of breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, unfair business practice, fraudulent business practice, declaratory relief for unlawful foreclosure, and financial abuse of an elder. Plaintiffs have a Notice of Action Pending ("Lis Pendens") on their former residence at 2444 Oceanic Drive, Fairfield, CA 94533.
Presently before the Court is a Motion by Defendant to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)*fn1 . Defendant also moves to Expunge the Lis Pendens recorded against Plaintiffs' residence. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and Expunge are granted in part and denied in part.*fn2
This action arises out of activity surrounding a residential loan transaction for Plaintiffs' property located in the City of Fairfield, County of Solano, California. On July 18, 2006, Plaintiffs entered into a mortgage loan for $380,700. Defendant was the servicer of Plaintiffs' mortgage.
In July 2009, Plaintiffs entered into a written agreement with Defendant, the Home Affordable Modification Trial Period Plan ("HAMP"). The HAMP is a home loan modification program that amends mortgages for homeowners who certify that they are unable to afford mortgage payments on their principal residence.
In order to receive the modification agreement, homeowners must first pass through the HAMP's "trial period" of three months where they are required to make regular and timely mortgage payments, and during which time the terms of the original loan remain in place. Plaintiffs incorrectly sent their first trial period payment to the wrong address. Plaintiffs later corrected their mistake and sent payment to the correct address, but Defendant refused the payment as late, thereby causing Plaintiffs to fail the trial period and be denied the modification agreement. Plaintiffs were advised by Defendant to reapply for the HAMP, but chose not to do so.
Defendant proceeded with foreclosure on the residence and recorded a Notice of Default in the Official Records of Solano County on August 17, 2009.*fn4 Defendant indicates that Plaintiffs were $23,356.90 behind on their mortgage payments as of August 14, 2009. Defendant recorded the Notice of Trustee's Sale in the Official Records of Solano County on December 23, 2009. The foreclosure sale was initially scheduled for January 11, 2010, but was rescheduled on several occasions until it was eventually sold to a third party on July 27, 2010. Plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit against Defendant on January 11, 2010, and recorded a Lis Pendens on the property. ///
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," to "give the defendant fair notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Though "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion" need not contain "detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 2869 (1986)). A plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) ("[T]he pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.")).
Further, "Rule 8(a)(2)...requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing...grounds on which the claim rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations omitted). A pleading must then contain "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. If the "plaintiffs...have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Id.
Once the court grants a motion to dismiss, they must then decide whether to grant a plaintiff leave to amend. Rule 15(a) authorizes the court to freely grant leave to amend when there is no "undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In fact, leave to amend is generally only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot possibly be cured by an amended version. See DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992); Balistieri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F. 2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) ("A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) ...