The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Janis L. SammartinoUnited States District Judge
(1) GRANTING REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE;
(2) GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Presently before the Court are Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s (1) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Eugenio Beltrame's second amended complaint (Doc No. 32) and (2) request for judicial notice (Doc. No. 32-2 (RJN)). Also before the Court are Plaintiff's opposition (Doc. No. 35 (Opp'n)) and Defendant's reply (Doc. No. 36 (Reply)). Having fully considered the facts and the law, the Court GRANTS Defendant's request for judicial notice and GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff owns property located at 45600 Rainbow Canyon Road, Temecula, California. (Doc. No. 31 (SAC) ¶ 2.) On July 17, 2007, Plaintiff applied for a loan with Defendant in the amount of $372,000.00. (Id. ¶¶ 2--3.) The loan was approved the next day and secured by a deed of trust on the property. (Id.) In April 2009, "Plaintiff began to suspect that Defendant was overcharging Plaintiff for his mortgage payment." (Id. ¶ 6.) He alleges that he subsequently sent Defendant two qualified written requests (QWRs), and that Defendant only responded to one. (Id. ¶¶ 7--26.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the defense that the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although Rule 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' . . . it [does] demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ---- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible if the facts pleaded "allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but there must be "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. Facts "'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, the Court need not accept as true "legal conclusions" contained in the complaint. Id. This review requires context-specific analysis involving the Court's "judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950 (citation omitted). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged----but it has not 'show[n]'----'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id.
1. Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice
In moving to dismiss Plaintiff's SAC, Defendant asks the Court to judicially notice three documents. (RJN 1--2.) The Court took judicial notice of the same three documents in ruling on Defendant's previous motions to dismiss. (Doc. No. 20, at 3; Doc. No. 30 (Order), at 3.) Under the circumstances, the Court finds that ...