The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. United States District Judge
Plaintiff has filed a request for reconsideration of this court's order filed January 18, 2011, denying plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction.
Standards For Motions To Reconsider
Although motions to reconsider are directed to the sound discretion of the court, Frito-Lay of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Canas, 92 F.R.D. 384, 390 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1981), considerations of judicial economy weigh heavily in the process. Thus Local Rule 230(j) requires that a party seeking reconsideration of a district court's order must brief the "new or different facts or circumstances [which] were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion." The rule derives from the "law of the case" doctrine which provides that the decisions on legal issues made in a case "should be followed unless there is substantially different evidence . . . new controlling authority, or the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would result in injustice." Handi Investment Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 653 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Waggoner v. Dallaire, 767 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986).
Courts construing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), providing for the alteration or amendment of a judgment, have noted that a motion to reconsider is not a vehicle permitting the unsuccessful party to "rehash" arguments previously presented, or to present "contentions which might have been raised prior to the challenged judgment." Costello v. United States, 765 F.Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D.Cal. 1991); see also F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986). These holdings "reflect district courts' concerns for preserving dwindling resources and promoting judicial efficiency." Costello, 765 F.Supp. at 1009.
In the instant action, plaintiff alleges new facts have developed that warrant the reconsideration of the court's January 18, 2011 order denying plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiff states he attended a classification hearing on February 11, 2011, during which he was informed that he is not a security risk, and "[o]nly because Sacramento Headquarters) asked for more inmate bodies to fill the vacancy at Ironwood State Prison, [plaintiff] is now convenient for transfer." (Dkt. No. 33 at 4.) Plaintiff states that other, "less attractive [programming]" inmates are not being transferred, which plaintiff claims "begs the question then why am I being transferred." (Dkt. No. 33 at 4.) Plaintiff also contends that access to the law library at Ironwood State Prison is a concern because Ironwood goes on lockdown more frequently than MCSP. (Id.)
As noted in the December 2, 2010 findings and recommendations, plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to be housed at a particular facility or institution. (Dkt. No. 21 at 2.) Plaintiff has provided new evidence that demonstrates the CDCR needs to transfer more prisoners to Ironwood State Prison. Plaintiff has provided no new evidence that his transfer is based on retaliation for plaintiff filing the instant action.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, upon reconsideration, this court's order of January 18, 2011 is affirmed.
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