The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
COGNIZABLE IN A PROCEEDING
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2254
ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE A
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
AND DIRECTING THE CLERK TO CLOSE THE ACTION
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Petitioner has consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case, including the entry of final judgment, by manifesting consent in a signed writing filed by Petitioner on February 9, 2011 (doc. 3). Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on February 1, 2011, and transferred to this division on March 3, 2011.
I. Screening the Petition
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires that the Court summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court...." Habeas Rule 4; O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990).
Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2001).
Petitioner alleges that he is an inmate of the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (CSATF) serving a sentence of seven (7) years to life imposed in the Shasta County Superior Court in 1988 upon Petitioner's conviction of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery with the use of a firearm (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 209(a), 12022.5). (Pet. 1.) Petitioner challenges the decision of California's Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) made after a hearing held on August 4, 2009, finding Petitioner unsuitable for parole. (Pet. 20.)
It appears from Petitioner's allegations and the transcript of the parole hearing submitted with the petition that Petitioner attended the parole hearing before the board on August 4, 2009, and spoke with the board about various suitability factors. (Pet. [doc. 1], 56-137.) Petitioner was also represented by counsel, who questioned Petitioner and advocated on Petitioner's behalf. (Doc. 1, 59, 64-65, 133-37; doc. 1-1, 1-14.)
The transcript of the hearing also reflects that Petitioner was present at the conclusion of the hearing when the BPH explained why it decided that Petitioner was not suitable for parole. (Doc. 1-1, 15-29.)
Petitioner asks this Court to review whether there was some evidence to support the conclusion that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole because he posed an unreasonable risk to public safety if released. (Pet. 15-16.) Petitioner also argues that because he met all previously imposed requirements for parole suitability, the denial of parole violated state and federal due process rights. (Id.) Petitioner contends that because there was an absence of some evidence to support the BPH's decision, Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated, and the state courts' decisions upholding the denial of parole were unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law. (Id.)
III. Failure to State a Cognizable Claim Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999).
A district court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. --, -, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court has characterized as reasonable the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that California law creates a liberty interest in parole protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, which in turn requires fair procedures with respect to the liberty interest. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. --, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861-62 (2011).
However, the procedures required for a parole determination are the minimal requirements set forth in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and ...