The opinion of the court was delivered by: Irma E. Gonzalez, Chief Judge United States District Court
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY DEFENDANTS [Doc. No. 18]
Presently before the Court is the motion to dismiss Plaintiff Kaveh Khast's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed by Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and California Reconveyance Company. This motion is suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss.
The factual background of this case, as described in Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, is fully set forth in the Court's October 26, 2010, order and will not be repeated herein.
On October 18, 2010, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against Defendants Washington Mutual Bank ("WaMu"), JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., ("Chase" or "JPM Chase"), and California Reconveyance Company ("CRC"). Plaintiff's complaint alleges thirteen causes of action: (1) violations of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, and its implementing Federal Reserve Board Regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 ("Regulation Z"), against WaMu and Chase; (2) unfair debt collection practices in violation of the Federal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617, against Chase and CRC; (3) additional violations of RESPA, against all Defendants; (4) violations of CAL. CIV. CODE § 3412 (grounds for cancellation of a written instrument), against Chase and CRC; (5) unjust enrichment, against WaMu and Chase; (6) promissory estoppel, against Chase; (7) a demand for accounting, against WaMu and Chase; (8) breach of implied warranties and violations of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784, against WaMu and Chase; (9) disgorgement under California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") CAL.. PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210, against WaMu and Chase; (10) fraud in violation of the UCL, against WaMu and Chase; (11) fraud in violation of the UCL, against Chase; (12) negligence, against all Defendants; and (13) declaratory relief, against WaMu and Chase.
Chase and CRC moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on November 12, 2010. On November 29, 2010, Plaintiff filed a notice of substitution of attorney, naming Ahren A. Tiller as counsel. [Doc. No. 21.] On December 7, 2010, Plaintiff, through his attorney, filed an opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. 28.] Defendants submitted a reply brief in support of their motion. [Doc. No. 32.]
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must accept all factual allegations pled in the complaint as true, and must construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, rather, it must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
However, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)) (alteration in original). A court need not accept "legal conclusions" as true. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiff's allegations, it is not proper for the court to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Plaintiff alleges jurisdiction in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), based on his TILA, FDCPA, and RESPA claims. Plaintiff alleges this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state a claim under any federal cause of action. Therefore, Plaintiff's federal claims are dismissed, and the Court declines to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims.
I.CLAIMS PLAINTIFF CONCEDES ARE SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL
Plaintiff concedes that his third, seventh, eighth, and thirteenth causes of action- respectively, for alleged violations of RESPA, for an accounting, for breach of implied warranties under California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and for declaratory relief-should be ...