The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge
ORDER: DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Multibank 2009-1 RES-ADC Venture LLC's motion for summary judgment against Defendant San Diego Community Housing Corporation (SDCHC). (Doc. No. 53.) Also before the Court are SDCHC's opposition (Doc. No. 55 (Opp'n)), SDCHC's evidentiary objections (Doc. No. 56 (Objs.)), Plaintiff's reply (Doc. No.59), and the parties' supplemental pleadings informing the Court regarding 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II) (Doc. Nos. 64 (SDCHC's Suppl. Mem.), 65 (Pl.'s Suppl. Mem.)).*fn1 Having considered the parties' arguments and the law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
On or about January 24, 2005, SDCHC secured a loan in the principal amount of $3,485,000 from 1st Centennial Bank. (Doc. No. 53-2 (Pl.'s SSUMF) ¶ 6.) SDCHC executed a promissory note as evidence of its obligation to repay. (Id.; see Doc. Nos. 53-3 to -6 (Yaffe Decl.) Ex. C.)*fn2 The note was secured by a deed of trust encumbering the properties at 512 June Way and 513 La Rue Way, El Cajon, California. (Pl.'s SSUMF ¶ 12; see Doc. Nos. 53-7 to -10 (Lazar Decl. ISO MSJ) Ex. B (Pl.'s RFAs) Ex. G.)
The parties modified the terms of the promissory note five times to, inter alia, extend the maturity date and increase the principal amount. (Pl.'s SSUMF ¶¶ 7-11; see Pl.'s RFAs Exs. B--F.) The promissory note as finally modified obligated SCHDC to repay $4,117,000 on April 24, 2008. (Pl.'s SSUMF ¶ 10--11; see Pl.'s RFAs Ex. F.)
SDCHC defaulted on the loan in September 2007. (Pl.'s SSUMF ¶¶ 14--15, 19.) On November 17, 2009, the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission, as receiver of 1st Centennial Bank, filed a complaint for, inter alia, judicial foreclosure in San Diego Superior Court. (Doc. No. 1 Ex. A.) SDCHC removed the action to this Court on December 23, 2009. (Doc. No. 1.) On March 15, 2010, the Court granted the parties' joint motion to substitute Plaintiff in place of the FDIC as receiver of 1st Centennial Bank. (Doc. No. 19.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a court to grant summary judgment where (1) the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and (2) entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "Material," for purposes of Rule 56, means that the fact, under governing substantive law, could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). For a dispute to be "genuine," a reasonable jury must be able to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls on themoving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant can carry his burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party "failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Id. at 322--23. "Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
Once the moving party establishes the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts showing that a genuine issue of disputed fact remains. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmoving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by "rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to a decree of foreclosure of the deed of trust that preserves Plaintiff's right to a deficiency judgment. (See Doc. No. 53-1 (Mem. ISO MSJ) 4--6.) According to SDCHC, however, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Plaintiff can enforce the note. (Opp'n 4--9.) SDCHC also contends that, even if Plaintiff can enforce the note, Plaintiff is ...