The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Dana M. Sabraw United States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING JUDGMENT DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
This case comes before the Court on Defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to the motion, and the time for doing so has expired. After reviewing the moving papers and the record on file herein, the Court grants Defendant's motion.
Since day one, the focal point of this case has been an assignment between the bankruptcy estate of Barrie Logan and Plaintiff A.E. Motorcycle Tech, Inc. ("AEMT"). Defendant has steadfastly maintained that the assignment did not grant Plaintiffs the right to bring the current case. After the Court denied Defendant's motion for reconsideration on the issue, Defendant returned to the bankruptcy court, which has now issued a final judgment on the matter. Specifically, that court found:
The Notice of Intended Action and Opportunity for Hearing, and the Order on Intended Action and Opportunity for Hearing re: Santa Clara Litigation, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibits A and B, respectively, did not approve or authorize defendants to bring a claim for avoidance and recovery of preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) against plaintiff[.] (Req. for Judicial Notice in Supp. of Renewed Mot., Ex. L.) Defendant relies on this finding as the basis for its renewed motion for summary judgment.
Defendant renews its motion for summary judgment that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this case. It asserts the bankruptcy court has now adjudicated this issue in its favor, and the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes Plaintiffs from relitigating the issue here.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party must identify the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, or other evidence that it "believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth." S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982).
The burden then shifts to the opposing party to show that summary judgment is not appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The opposing party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, to avoid summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, it must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. See also Butler v. San Diego District Attorney's Office, 370 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating if defendant produces enough evidence to require plaintiff to go beyond pleadings, plaintiff must counter by producing evidence of his own). More than a "metaphysical doubt" is required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
As set out in the Court's order on Defendant's initial motion for summary judgment, "[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel promotes judicial economy and protects parties from the burden of successive litigation by barring the relitigation of issues in certain circumstances." Maciel v. C.I.R., 489 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2007). Those circumstances are: (1) "'the issue necessarily decided at the previous proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated;'" Af-Cap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005));
(2) "'there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the previous action;'" In re Palmer, 207 F.3d 566, 568 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pena v. ...