ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This case is before the undersigned pursuant to Eastern District of California Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Presently pending for decision is plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, which is noticed for hearing on April 27, 2011. Dckt. Nos. 45, 47. The court has determined that oral argument will not materially assist in resolving the motion and, accordingly, the April 27 hearing on the motion is vacated pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). The court has carefully reviewed the pleadings and evidence on file and finds that for the reasons stated below, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment must be granted.
Defendants Castle and Karakasevic have filed Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") financial statements against federal employees. Plaintiff, the United States brings this action "to obtain a judicial declaration that certain documents filed by defendants James C. Castle and Lara Karakasevic with the Secretary of State for the State of California against certain employees of the United States are null, void, and without legal effect; and to enjoin the defendants from all future filings of similar documents." Second Am. Compl., Dckt. No. 29, at 1.
On February 17, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and noticed the motion for hearing before the undersigned on March 23, 2011. Dckt. No. 45. Defendants did not file an opposition or a statement of non-opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and a response to plaintiff's statement of undisputed facts, in violation of Local Rules 230(c) and 260(b).*fn1 Therefore, on March 17, 2011, the court issued an order explaining the requirements set forth in Local Rules 230(c) and 260(b); continuing the hearing on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment to April 27, 2011; ordering defendants to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for their failure to timely file an opposition or a statement of non-opposition to the pending motion and for their failure to timely file a response to plaintiff's statement of undisputed facts; and directing defendants to file an opposition to the motion, or a statement of non-opposition thereto, and a response to plaintiff's statement of undisputed facts, no later than April 13, 2011. Dckt. No. 47. The order further provided that "[a] failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be granted." Id.
On April 6, 2011, defendants filed a "Notice of Conditional Acceptance" of the March 17 order to show cause. Dckt. No. 48. However, defendants still have not filed an opposition or a statement of non-opposition to the pending motion, a response to plaintiff's statement of undisputed facts, or a substantive response to the March 17 order to show cause. ////
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment against defendants "declaring that the UCC Financing Statements and UCC Financing Statement Amendments filed by defendants James C. Castle and Lara Karakasevic against federal government employees are null, void, and of no legal effect, and enjoining Defendants from filing similar sham UCC Financing Statements in the future." Dckt. No. 45 at 1. Plaintiff requests the entry of a permanent injunction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a). Dckt. No. 45-1 at 1.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
Summary judgment avoids unnecessary trials in cases with no genuinely disputed material facts. See N.W. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). At issue is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Thus, Rule 56 serves to screen the latter cases from those which actually require resolution of genuine disputes over material facts; e.g., issues that can only be determined through presentation of testimony at trial such as the credibility of conflicting testimony over facts that make a difference in the outcome. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. ////
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the opposing party must establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To overcome summary judgment, the opposing party must demonstrate a factual dispute that is both material, i.e. it affects the outcome of the claim under the governing law, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). In attempting to establish the existence of a factual dispute that is genuine, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11.
In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).
Based on the pleadings and evidence on file in this action, the court finds the following facts to be undisputed:
In the course of his official Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") duties,
Revenue Officer Paul Enjalran was involved in the collection of unpaid
federal tax liability from James Castle and his wife, Lara
Karakasevic. Pl.'s Stmt. of Undisputed Facts ("SUF") ¶ 1.*fn2
On or about September 19, 2009, Revenue Officer Enjalran went
to Castle's residential address, spoke with Karakasevic, and delivered
a sealed envelope for Castle containing a Final Notice of Intent to
Levy and publications informing Castle of his rights. SUF ¶ 2. On or
about September 21, 2009, Enjalran requested, through the Automated
Lien System, that a Notice of Federal Tax Lien be recorded against
Castle in Sonoma County, California, for his outstanding tax federal
income tax liabilities. SUF ¶ 3.
On or about September 24, 2009, Enjalran received correspondence from Castle which included three fictitious financing instruments labeled "Money Order, Private Issue" in the amounts of $68,724.80, $7,115.33 and $3,153.77. The correspondence falsely claimed that the money orders were backed by the Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS. Because the money orders appeared to be fictitious financing instruments, Enjalran did not process them. SUF ¶ 4.
On or about October 5, 2009, Enjalran received a telephone call from Castle asking why he had filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien even though he had received Castle's "money orders." Enjalran informed Castle that the "money orders" were invalid and asked where Castle obtained them. Castle stated that the "money orders" came from the Department of Treasury and suggested that Enjalran contact the Criminal Investigation Division. Enjalran ...