(Super. Ct. No. 07F06742)
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Nicholson , J.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
A jury found defendant Deonte Santos guilty on six counts of lewd conduct with a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)),*fn1 and three counts of procuring a child to engage in a lewd act (§ 266j). Sentenced to 24 years in state prison, defendant appeals his conviction. Defendant contends his convictions for procuring a child to engage in lewd acts are barred by section 656. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
In October 2007, defendant was convicted in federal court of the use of an interstate facility to entice a minor to engage in sexual conduct or prostitution (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) and sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, or coercion (18 U.S.C. § 1591). For his crimes, defendant was sentenced to 12 years six months in federal prison.
Defendant was subsequently charged in Sacramento County Superior Court with six counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a minor under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)), and three counts of procuring a minor for the purpose of a lewd and lascivious act (§ 266j). Defendant pled not guilty.
Defendant then moved to dismiss the three counts of child procurement (§ 266j), arguing that the acts for which he was convicted in federal court under Title 18 United States Code section 1591, were the same for which he was now being tried in state court under section 266j. Thus, he argued, the prosecutor was barred under section 656 from charging him with the crime of child procurement. The trial court denied defendant's motion, finding the federal crime of child trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 1591) included "a commercial element" not found in the state crime of child procurement (§ 266j).
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. Specifically, defendant argues that although the acts constituting the state crime of child procurement are not sufficient to prove the federal crime of child trafficking, they are necessary to do so. Accordingly, he contends, prosecution of the state crimes was barred under section 656. Defendant is wrong.
"The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not preclude multiple convictions in different sovereign jurisdictions for the same criminal act. (Heath v. Alabama (1985) 474 U.S. 82, 93 [88 L.Ed.2d 387, 397].) However, a state can provide greater double jeopardy protection than is afforded by the federal ...