The opinion of the court was delivered by: United States District Judge William Q. Hayes
The matter before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (ECF No. 2).
On April 21, 2011, Plaintiff Don A. Spraggins, a nonprisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing the Complaint against Defendant the Hon. Judge William F. Morse ("Judge Morse") and Defendant State of Alaska. (ECF No. 1). On that same day, Plaintiff filed the Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (ECF No. 2).
All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).
In his declaration accompanying the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Plaintiff states that he is employed and receives $1,000 per month as well as $120 per month in veteran disability benefits. Plaintiff states that he has two checking accounts with $100 in each account and Plaintiff has two savings accounts with $100 in each account. Plaintiff states that he does not have any other significant assets such as a vehicle, real estate, stocks, bonds or securities. Plaintiff states that contributes $400 a month to support his children and $300 a month to support his ex-wife. Plaintiff states that he incurs a debt of $200 per month in student loans.
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's declaration of assets and finds it is sufficient to show that Plaintiff is unable to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain this action. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
II. Initial Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)
After granting in forma pauperis status, the Court must review complaints filed by all persons and dismiss the case if the complaint "is frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides: "A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction...; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rule 8(d) provides that "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). The standard used to evaluate a motion to dismiss is a liberal one, particularly when the action has been filed pro se. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976). "[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) "parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"). However, even a "liberal interpretation ... may not supply elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff asserts that his right to due process, his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, his right to equal protection, and his right of access to the court, were denied by Defendants Judge Morse and the State of Alaska. Plaintiff alleges that in March 2010, he filed a motion to reopen a case which had been filed in April 1997 and disposed of in November 1997 and submitted a "sworn complaint." (ECF No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Judge Morse "denied [Plaintiff's] sworn complaint that Sherina Cox [Plaintiff's ex-wife] had made wild and false statements under oath in case 3AN-95-286CI." Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that "[s]ince August 1994 the State of Alaska has allowed the defendant to continuously make wild and false allegations to deprive [Plaintiff] of [his] Civil Rights. They honored her statements as truth." Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that "the evidence shall speak for itself" and cites to five Alaska case numbers, a "Wasilla police report," "[the] Judge's findings," and Plaintiff's "sworn" criminal complaint against Sherina Cox. Id.
Plaintiff alleges several incidents between December 1994 through November 1997 in which Plaintiff's ex-wife filed a "false rape report," filed a "false domestic violence report," "made false statements under oath," "made false statements to [police officers]," and "made wild and false statements under oath" against Plaintiff. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff also alleges several incidents between December 1994 through November 1997 in which several judges, other than Defendant Judge Morse, and Alaska state agencies "Denied [Plaintiff's] right to justice," failed to respond to Plaintiff's report that Sherina Cox had made "wild and false statements," "denied [Plaintiff] due process in determining child support payments," "coerced [Plaintiff] to change his plea from not guilty to no-contest by threatening to force [his] 8 year old daughter to testify," "denied [Plaintiff equal protection under local domestic violence laws," and "knew about the actions of Sherina Cox and did nothing." Id. Plaintiff alleges that Shirley Vincent, Alaska child care assistance program worker, also made a false allegation to Plaintiff's military commander in June 1995 while she was "acting with the State Attorney General" and "accus[ing Plaintiff] of a crime with no due process." Id. at 3.
To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct he complains of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that conduct violated a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d ...