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Keith Zon Doolin v. Michael Martel

May 18, 2011


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Anthony W. Ishii Chief United States District Judge

Order Amending Schedule for Petitioner's Case Management and Budget Plan


On March 9, 2011, the Phase I-B Case Management and Budget Plan for Petitioner Keith Zon Doolin ("Doolin") was approved. The Phase 1-B Budget includes tasks necessary to prepare and file Doolin's federal habeas petition, extends through the determination of exhaustion and abeyance, if necessary, or the filing of the answer, and is currently scheduled to extend through August, 2011.

Doolin first sought federal habeas corpus relief August 17, 2009, and the Federal Defender was appointed to represent him October 14, 2009. The parties agreed the statute of limitations ("SOL") would expire October 5, 2010, one year after the denial of certiorari on Doolin's direct appeal. During the investigation of Doolin's federal habeas petition, the Federal Defender discovered a conflict in their representation which required them to withdraw, and new counsel was appointed under the Criminal Justice Act to represent Doolin on June 15, 2010. 2 The Court found that seven months of equitable tolling was reasonable in 3 light of the facts of this case. The one year statute of limitations for Doolin's 4 federal habeas petition was extended to April 27, 2011. The parties subsequently 5 stipulated to additional equitable tolling to July 20, 2011, based on the 6 unexpected illness of one of Doolin's counsel. 7 After approval of Doolin's Phase I-B budget, the United States Supreme 8 Court issued Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (April 4, 2011), 9 limiting the evidence a federal court can consider in determining whether a petitioner has met the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). On April 7, 2011, this Court issued an order in this case, suspending all work on issues affected by Pinholster. An order was issued on May 18, 2011, to clarify the information needed from Doolin to inform reconsideration of the Phase I-B Budget in light of Pinholster.

Pinholster noted the following limitations the AEDPA has imposed on applications for federal habeas relief, in Title 28 of the United States Code:

1. Section 2254(a) only permits consideration of applications for habeas relief which allege that a person is in state custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."

2. Sections 2254(b) and (c) prohibit granting applications, with certain exceptions, where the applicant has not exhausted state remedies.

3. Section 2254(d) prohibits granting applications that have been "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings, . . . unless the adjudication of the claim,

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or "(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."

4. For claims not subject to § 2254(d) (i.e., procedurally defaulted claims), if a prisoner "failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings," § 2254(e)(2) bars a federal court from holding an evidentiary hearing, unless the applicant meets certain statutory requirements.
The standard of 2254(d) is "difficult to meet," Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011), and it is a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt," Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The petitioner carries the burden of proof. Id., at 25. Section 2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary denial. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Pinholster clarified that "review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. Further, the Court in Pinholster noted that the focus of section 2254(e)(2) is not to preserve the opportunity for hearings, but to limit the discretion of federal courts in holding hearings. Id., at 1401 n.8.

The holding of Pinholster presents questions about when investigative and expert services may be authorized, and when the threshold of § 2254(d)(1) must be applied. The following process for approval of funding prior to filing the petition will be imposed in this case:

1. In the case of legally exhausted claims for which a factual basis was presented in state court, pre-petition fact development will be precluded, unless the factual basis presented in state court is shown to have been incomplete so that additional fact development would lead to the formation of a new, unexhausted claim.

2. For unexhausted claims, the authorization of funds for pre-petition fact development will be determined by the following factors in addition to guiding principles outlined in the Ninth ...

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