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Thomas Goolsby v. Neal Ridge

May 23, 2011


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ruben B. Brooks United States Magistrate Judge


On May 10, 2011, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [ECF Nos. 13, 20]. The next day, on May 11, 2011, Defendants' Ex Parte Application for an Order Referring This Case To the Magistrate Judge was filed, along with the Declaration fo Sylvie P. Snyder and the Notice, Consent and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge [ECF No. 21]. Plaintiff had consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction when he filed his First Amended Complaint.*fn1 On May 19, 2011, United States District Court JudgeWilliam Q. Hayes granted Defendants' Ex Parte Application and referred the case to this Court [ECF No. 22]. Accordingly, in light of the consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction, this Order supercedes the Report and Recommendation issued on May 10, 2011 [ECF No. 20].

Plaintiff Thomas Goolsby, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint against Defendants Ridge, Martinez, Sanchez, and Wilson on November 23, 2009, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF Nos. 1, 4]. He filed an Amended Complaint, along with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, on March 24, 2010 [ECF No. 5]. In his subsequent pleading, Plaintiff included Ridge, Martinez, and Wilson, but not Defendant Sanchez. (See Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 5.) On September 16, 2010, Defendants Ridge, Martinez, and Wilson filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, along with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of J. Rivera, and the Declaration of R. Cobb [ECF No. 13]. The Court issued a Klingele/Rand Notice advising Plaintiff of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, in part, for failure to exhaust, and allowing Goolsby time to present any additional evidence demonstrating exhaustion [ECF No. 15]. Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, with Goolsby's "jail records" attached as an exhibit, was filed along with an exhibit nunc pro tunc to November 2, 2010 [ECF No. 17]. The Court construes this pleading as Plaintiff's Opposition.*fn2 On December 3, 2010, Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed [ECF No. 18].

The Court has reviewed the Amended Complaint and attachment, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and attachments, Plaintiff's Opposition and exhibits, and Defendants' Reply. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.


Although Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, California, the allegations in the Amended Complaint arise from events that occurred while Goolsby was housed at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("Donovan") between December 16, 2008, and February 11, 2009. (Am. Compl. 1, 3, ECF No. 5.) In his Amended Complaint, Goolsby alleges that he was transferred from San Diego County Jail to Donovan on December 16, 2008. (Id. at 3.) He claims that shortly before his transfer to Donovan, medical doctors at San Diego County Jail had diagnosed the following injuries: a potentially torn rotator cuff, sprained or strained back and neck muscles, possible strictures (intestinal cuts), a human bite on his right hand, and damaged back muscles. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff asserts he received these injuries because he fell down stairs, had an altercation with his cell partner, and collapsed in his cell. (Id.) Goolsby states that the doctors at county jail treated his injuries by giving him a neck brace, a walker, and medications. (Id. at 5.) The doctors ordered several tests to be performed on Plaintiff: a magnetic resonance imaging test ("MRI"), to ascertain whether Goolsby's rotator cuff was torn; an endoscopy; and a colonoscopy. (Id.)

In count one of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends that medical doctors Ridge and Martinez violated his constitutional rights to receive adequate medical care and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 3; id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 1-2.) Specifically, Goolsby states that Defendants Ridge and Martinez were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (Am. Compl. 3, 8, 11, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff argues that these Defendants were aware of his medical needs because of his previous doctors' orders for medical care and his repeated requests for medical attention. (Id. at 4, 6-8.) According to Goolsby, despite Defendants' awareness of his condition, they did not examine Plaintiff's injuries, order medication, or ensure that the medical tests ordered by the doctors at county jail were performed. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff maintains that Ridge and Martinez also failed to order that his walker be returned to him after it was improperly taken by Defendant Wilson, a correctional officer at Donovan. (Id. at 9, 11.)

In counts two and three, Goolsby makes similar Eighth Amendment claims regarding Defendant Wilson's deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs and Wilson's failure to protect Plaintiff from the use of excessive force. (Id. at 15-16; id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7 (citing Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)).) Goolsby alleges in count two that Wilson acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's severe neck, back, and shoulder pain when Wilson took Goolsby's walker from him, forced him to live in a top-tier cell, and handcuffed his arms behind his back. (Am. Compl. 13-15, ECF No. 5; id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5-6.) Plaintiff contends in count three that Defendant Wilson's actions constituted a failure to protect Goolsby from "painful and unsafe activities." (Am. Compl. 16, ECF No. 5; id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6-7.)


A. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). "The old formula --- that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt without merit --- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)]." Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008). A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). This Court must accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id., __ U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; see also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).

The Court does not look at whether the plaintiff will "ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where there "is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).

The Court need not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint as true; rather, it must "examine whether [they] follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff." Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 973 (citing Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994)) (stating that on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court "is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged[]"). "Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

When resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court generally may not consider materials outside the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995). "The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint." Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes consideration of "new" allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff's opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993); 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 12.34[2] (3d ed. 1997) ("The court may not . . . take into account additional facts asserted in a memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss, because such memoranda do not constitute pleadings under Rule 7(a).")).

"When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether dismissal [i]s proper . . . ." Parks Sch. of Bus., 51 F.3d at 1484 (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)). The Court may also consider "documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading . . . ." Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002); Stone v. Writer's Guild of Am. W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996).

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is "particularly important in civil rights cases." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, the Court may not "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). "Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). "The plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff's claim." Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint "unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987)). Thus, before a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint's deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. Where amendment of a pro se litigant's complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show (1) a person acting "under color of state law" committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986).

These Rule 12 (b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendants' Motion.


Defendants Ridge, Martinez, and Wilson move to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and under a theory of qualified immunity. (Mot. Dismiss 1-2, ECF No. 13; id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, 22.)

A. Exhaustion

1. Motion to Dismiss Unexhausted Claims Pursuant to the Unenumerated Portions of Rule 12(b)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") states: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . 42 U.S.C. 1983 . . . or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 2003). The exhaustion requirement applies regardless of the relief sought. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (citation omitted).

"'[A]n action is "brought" for purposes of § 1997e(a) when the complaint is tendered to the district clerk[]' . . . ." Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004)). Therefore, prisoners must "exhaust administrative remedies before submitting any papers to the federal courts." Id. at 1048 (emphasis added).

Section 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement creates an affirmative defense. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). "[D]efendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion." Id. (footnote omitted). Defendants in § 1983 actions properly raise the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies through an unenumerated motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). Id. (citations omitted).

Unlike motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, "[i]n deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact." Id. at 1119-20 (citing Ritza v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988)) (footnote omitted). Courts have discretion regarding the method they use to resolve such factual disputes. Ritza, 837 F.2d at 369 (citations omitted). "A court ruling on a motion to dismiss also may take judicial notice of 'matters of public record.'" Hazleton v. Alameida, 358 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted)). But "if the district court looks beyond the pleadings to a factual record in deciding the motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust[,] . . . the court must assure that [the plaintiff] has fair notice of his opportunity to develop a record." Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14.

"[When] the district court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted non-judicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice." Id. at 1120 (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d at 368 n.3).

2. The Administrative Grievance Process

"The California Department of Corrections ['CDC'] provides a four-step grievance process for prisoners who seek review of an administrative decision or perceived mistreatment: an informal level, a first formal level, a second formal level, and the Director's level." Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1048-49 (citing Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005)). The administrative appeal system can be found in title 15, sections 3084.1, 3084.5, and 3084.6 of the California Code of Regulations ("CCR").*fn3 See Brown, 422 F.3d at 929-30 (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a), 3084.5(a)-(b), (e)(1)-(2), 3084.6(c) (amended 2011)).

To comply with the CDC's administrative grievance procedure, an inmate must submit the grievance at the informal level "within 15 working days of the event or decision being appealed . . . ." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c) (2010); see also Brown, 422 F.3d at 929. An inmate must proceed through all levels of the administrative grievance process before initiating a § 1983 suit in federal court. See Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1051.

A prisoner's grievances must be "sufficient under the circumstances to put the prison on notice of the potential claims and to fulfill the basic purposes of the exhaustion requirement." Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (S.D. Cal. 2001).

Exhaustion serves several important goals, including "allowing a prison to address complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to suit, reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88-91 (2006), Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002)).

3. Plaintiff's Failure to Exhaust Allegations Against Defendant Wilson

In count two of the Amended Complaint, Goolsby alleges that Correctional Officer Wilson confiscated Plaintiff's walker. (Am. Compl. 12, ECF No. 5.) Goolsby claims that he pleaded for his walker back, explaining to Defendant Wilson that without it he would suffer "serious pain and muscle spasm[]s and cramp[]s." (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff argues that Wilson ignored his pleas and refused to allow him to use the walker. (Id.) Additionally, Defendant Wilson failed to assign Goolsby to a lower-tier cell. (Id. at 14). Instead, Wilson assigned him to an upper-tier cell, forcing Goolsby to climb up the stairs to his cell without a walker, causing him "insane amounts of pain." (Id.) Plaintiff further complains that Defendant Wilson handcuffed Goolsby's hands behind his back, "causing intense and excruciating pain in [Plaintiff's] hurt right shoulder." (Id.) According to Goolsby, this treatment caused him to be "bed ridden virtually for weeks." (Id.) He asserts that Wilson's conduct amounted to a constitutional violation. (Id. at 15.)

Defendant Wilson maintains that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the claim against him in count two of the Amended Complaint because Goolsby did not submit a grievance "directly addressing" Wilson's purported confiscation of Plaintiff's walker or his assignment of Goolsby to the upper tier. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7-8, ECF No. 13.) Although none of the Defendants are named in Plaintiff's grievance, Defendants claim that Goolsby only submitted a grievance regarding the medical care provided by Dr. Ridge and Dr. Martinez. (Id. at 2, 8.) Because Plaintiff has not properly exhausted the administrative remedies for his claims against Wilson, Defendants argue the allegations should be dismissed. (Id. at 8.)

a. Failure to Provide a Medically-Prescribed Appliance

According to Defendants, "In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff admits that the inmate grievance he filed related only to the lack of medical care: 'I filed a (602) for lack of medical care.'" (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 1, ECF No. 13. (quoting Am. Compl. 17, ECF No. 5).) Defendants contend that the grievance alleging that Drs. Ridge and Martinez failed to examine Plaintiff would not have put the prison on notice of a claim against Correctional Officer Wilson for taking Goolsby's walker. (Id. at 8.) Defendants state, "Thus, the inmate grievance cannot be considered to have indirectly addressed Plaintiff's walker[] claim against Defendant Wilson." (Id.)

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's original Complaint mentioned only one grievance as well, and that grievance merely challenged Defendants Ridge and Martinez's alleged failure to provide adequate medical care. (Id. at 2 (citing Compl. 12, ECF No. 1).) To that end, Defendants ask the Court to consider the original Complaint that Goolsby filed on November 23, 2009. (Id. at 1-2 (citing Andrews v. Metro North Communter R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 707 (2nd Cir. 1989) (quoting White v. Acro/Polymers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1391, 1396 n.5 (5th Cir. 1983))); see Compl. 1, ECF No. 1; Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 5.) On March 9, 2010, the Court dismissed Goolsby's initial Complaint for failing to state a claim; Plaintiff filed this Amended Complaint on March 24, 2010. (Order 6-7, ECF No. 4; Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 5.)

"[W]hen a plaintiff files an amended complaint, '[t]he amended complaint supercedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.'" Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967)). "[F]actual assertions in the pleading and pretrial orders, unless amended, are considered judicial admissions conclusively binding." American Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Goolsby's Amended Complaint supercedes the initial Complaint, and the Court will consider the factual assertions in the Amended Complaint when analyzing whether Plaintiff exhausted his remedies. See Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1006; see also American Title Ins. Co., 861 F.2d at 226.

In his Opposition, Plaintiff maintains that he submitted a grievance asking to be examined by a physician, which indirectly exhausted his claim that Defendant Wilson took Goolsby's walker because the grievance was intended to aid him in retrieving his walker. (See Opp'n 2, ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff contends that to get his walker back, he would have to see a doctor, who would then have to reissue a walker to Goolsby. (Id.; see id. at 3.) Plaintiff explains:

I could have appealed C. Wilson directly, but that at best would only of [sic] reprimanded C. Wilson. My chief concern at the time wasn't punishing C. Wilson but getting to see the doctor to get my walker, medication and tests ordered as was badly needed. Theref[o]re the 602 appeal I filed exhausted count 2. As the action requested was the keystone to the walker. (Id. at 2.) Goolsby asserts that his appeal requesting to be seen by a physician exhausted his claim against Defendant Wilson for taking Goolsby's walker. (Id.)

When ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Court may "look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact." Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20 (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d at 369). Although Goolsby did not provide a copy of any administrative grievance with his Opposition, Defendants submitted a copy of the grievance as an exhibit to the Declaration of J. Rivera, a health care appeals coordinator at Donovan.*fn4 (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #2 Decl. Rivera Ex. B, at 8-9, ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff's appeal reads as follows:

A. Describe Problem: On December 16th 2008 I arrived at Richard J. Donovan from downtown county jail with a bruised neck, damaged lower back, a torn rotator cuff and gastronomical issues. For those debilitating medical ailments, I was prescribed Metamucil, Prilosec, Morphine, [Dicyclomine], Neurotin, and [Flexeril]! To date I've yet to see a doctor and all my medication has been stopped except for Prilosec and a fiber pill. I'm in excruciating pain, and all my requests for medical attention has been ignored. I've submitted 3 medical requests without response.

B. Action Requested: To be evaluated by a licensed doctor as per Title 15 upon new appeal. I'm being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.

(Id. Ex. B, at 9.) Additionally, Defendants attach the declarations of appeals coordinators who confirm that Goolsby only filed one grievance while incarcerated at Donovan and did not file any grievance against Correctional Officer Wilson. (Id. Decl. Rivera 2 (citing id. Ex. A); id. Attach. #3 Decl. Cobb 2.)

"Prisoners need comply only with the prison's own grievance procedures to properly exhaust . . . ." Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (2007)). Indeed, "exhaustion is not per se inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances." Jones, 549 U.S. at 219. At the time Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, California prison regulations required inmates to lodge administrative appeals that "describe[d] the specific issue under appeal and the relief requested." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, ยง 3084.2(a). "[W]hen a prison's grievance procedures are silent or incomplete as to factual specificity, 'a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.'" Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120 ...

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