The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge
SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND REMAINING CLAIMS (Doc. 1)
Plaintiff Brent Adler, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 15, 2010. The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted."
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences," Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendantpersonally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
II. Plaintiff's Complaint
Plaintiff brings this action against prison officials at the California Correctional Institution (CCI) for denial of adequate exercise between January 9, 2006, and December 9, 2008. Plaintiff arrived at CCI on January 9, 2006, to serve a Security Housing Unit (SHU) term. Plaintiff was classified approximately two weeks later and assigned group yard, which resulted in the receipt of 7 hours of outdoor exercise total, three days a week. For the two-week period pending that classification decision, Plaintiff did not receive any exercise. Plaintiff remained on the 7-hour schedule for an unspecified length of time.
On May 23, 2006, Plaintiff was transferred out from CCI for court proceedings. Around that time, prison officials cancelled the Wednesday morning exercise session. The exercise schedule rotated weekly between Tuesday/Thursday and Wednesday/Friday sessions, with morning and afternoon sessions also rotating. Plaintiff received 4 1/2 hours of outdoor exercise per week except when the schedule rotated around to the week of the cancelled Wednesday morning session and during that week, he received exercise once for approximately 2 to 3 hours.*fn1
On June 30, 2006, Plaintiff returned to CCI following court proceedings, and he again went without any exercise pending classification, which occurred on July 12, 2006. Plaintiff was placed on a caged "IEM" yard and he remained so assigned until September 6, 2006, during which time he received 145 minutes of outdoor exercise per week.*fn2
On September 6, 2006, Plaintiff was placed back on group yard with a rotating exercise schedule. Plaintiff received 4 1/2 hours of outdoor exercise, two days a week, except for when the schedule rotated around to the week of the cancelled Wednesday morning session. During that week, Plaintiff received 2-3 hours of exercise, once a week. Plaintiff remained on this schedule until June 7, 2007, at which time he was moved to a different building for non-punitive reasons.
After Plaintiff was moved to a different building, he received no exercise pending classification, which occurred on June 20, 2007. Plaintiff was placed back on group yard and he received between 4 and 5 hours of outdoor exercise per week, again on the Tuesday/Thursday and Wednesday/Friday rotation with morning and afternoon sessions also rotating. As occurred previously, the Wednesday morning session was cancelled, resulting in one week per month in which Plaintiff only exercised one day a week for between 120 and 150 minutes. During that week, Plaintiff would get outdoor exercise on ...