The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge
ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME; RECOMMENDATION; (3) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;(4) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY (2) ADOPTING REPORT AND (ECF Nos. 20, 22)
Presently before the Court is Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis's report and recommendation (R&R) advising the Court to deny Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus. (R&R, ECF No. 20.) Also before the Court are Petitioner's objections to the R&R. (Objections, ECF No. 24.) Having considered the parties' arguments and the law, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's objections, ADOPTS the R&R, and DENIES Petitioner's petition.
The Court presumes state court findings to be correct unless the petitioner "rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Magistrate Judge Lewis's R&R contains a thorough and accurate recitation of the facts underlying Petitioner's state court trial and conviction. (R&R 2--3.) This Order incorporates by reference the facts as set forth in the R&R.
Having exhausted his state remedies, Petitioner filed the instant petition, alleging that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) On August 6, 2010, Respondent answered the petition, urging the Court to dismiss the petition and deny a certificate of appealability. (ECF No. 16.) Petitioner filed a traverse to Respondent's answer on August 18, 2010. (ECF No. 19.) On February 8, 2011, Magistrate Judge Lewis issued an R&R advising the Court to deny the petition. (R&R.) Petitioner objected to the R&R on March 10, 2011. (Objections.)
1. Review of the Report of Recommendation
Federal Rule of Civil ProcedureRule 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district court's duties regarding the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The district court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made," and "may, accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673--76 (1980).
2. Cognizable Claim for Relief
Under federal law, a prisoner seeking relief on claims related to imprisonment may file a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal intervention in state court proceedings is only justified when there are errors of federal law. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989). Federal habeas courts are bound by a state's interpretation of its own laws. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322--23 (1997). The AEDPA establishes a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings," requiring "that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). A federal court can grant habeas relief only when the result of a claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court "was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if it (1) applies a rule that contradicts governing Supreme Court authority, or (2) "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court decision but reaches a different result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An "unreasonable" application of precedent "must have been more than incorrect or erroneous"; it "must have been 'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520--21(2003) (citation omitted).
1. Motion for Extension of Time
Magistrate Judge Lewis ordered Petitioner to file written objections to the R&R by February 24, 2011. (R&R 6.) Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to object on March 9, 2011 and filed his objections the next day. (ECF Nos. 22, 24.) Despite the filings' untimeliness, the Court accepted them nunc pro tunc to the dates received. (ECF Nos. 21, ...