IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
August 15, 2011
HARRISON L. BURTON, PLAINTIFF,
WARDEN MCDONALD, DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kendall J. Newman United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff has consented to proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) ("a judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless."); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
On the form section of the complaint, plaintiff checked the box that states the grievance process is completed. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) However, plaintiff included a handwritten portion that states the grievance process is not completed. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff states that the appeal coordinator held up the process, but that plaintiff "has sent the original to the Director's Level for Review Log #10-1151." (Id.)
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA") amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Exhaustion is a prerequisite for all prisoner suits regarding conditions of confinement, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. Porter, 534 U.S. at 532.
Exhaustion of all "available" remedies is mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be "plain, speedy and effective." Id. at 524; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740 n.5 (2001). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. A prisoner "seeking only money damages must complete a prison administrative process that could provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated, but no money." Id. at 734. The fact that the administrative procedure cannot result in the particular form of relief requested by the prisoner does not excuse exhaustion because some sort of relief or responsive action may result from the grievance. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 737; see also Porter, 534 U.S. at 525 (purposes of exhaustion requirement include allowing prison to take responsive action, filtering out frivolous cases, and creating administrative records).
A prisoner need not exhaust further levels of review once he has either received all the remedies that are "available" at an intermediate level of review, or has been reliably informed by an administrator that no more remedies are available. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). Because there can be no absence of exhaustion unless some relief remains available, a movant claiming lack of exhaustion must demonstrate that pertinent relief remained available, whether at unexhausted levels or through awaiting the results of the relief already granted as a result of that process. Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37.
As noted above, the PLRA requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006). "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Id. at 90-91. Thus, compliance with prison grievance procedures is required by the PLRA to properly exhaust. Id. The PLRA's exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied "by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal." Id. at 83-84.
The State of California provides its prisoners the right to appeal
"any departmental decision, action, condition or policy which they can
demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare." Cal. Code
Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a) (2010). It also provides them the right to
file appeals alleging misconduct by correctional officers and
officials. Id. at § 3084.1(e). In order to exhaust available
administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed
through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal
written appeal on a 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to
the institution head or designee, and
(4) third level appeal to the Director of the California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F.Supp. 1235,
1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5). A
final decision from the Director's level of review satisfies the
exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. at 1237-38.
Non-exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense which should be brought by defendants in an unenumerated motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). However, where it is clear from the face of Plaintiff's complaint that he has not yet exhausted the administrative grievance procedure, this action must be dismissed. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 ("A prisoner's concession to nonexhaustion is a valid grounds for dismissal. . . ."); see also Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002); Metoyer v. Post, 121 Fed.Appx. 749 (9th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff concedes he did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing the instant action. Plaintiff states he "has sent" his grievance to the Director's Level for review. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Therefore, plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed without prejudice. If plaintiff has received the Director's Level decision, he may file a new action raising these claims.
B. Class Action
Plaintiff appears to state potentially cognizable civil rights claims alleging violations of First Amendment rights. However, plaintiff articulates these claims as if he is pursuing a class action on behalf of all Muslim state prisoners housed at High Desert State Prison. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.)
Plaintiff is a non-lawyer proceeding without counsel. It is well established that a layperson cannot ordinarily represent the interests of a class. See McShane v. United States, 366
F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1966). This rule becomes almost absolute when, as here, the putative class representative is incarcerated and proceeding pro se. Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975). In direct terms, plaintiff cannot "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," as required by Rule 23(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Martin v. Middendorf, 420 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1976). Therefore, if plaintiff chooses to pursue the instant claims in a new action after he first exhausts his administrative remedies, he should refrain from raising class action claims and pursue only those violations suffered by himself.
C. Filing Fee
Prisoners granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis are required to pay the filing fee for bringing an action in federal court. However, because plaintiff's complaint is dismissed based on plaintiff's failure to first exhaust administrative remedies, the court refrained from imposing the filing fee. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that if he pursues the instant action, rather than file a new civil rights action, plaintiff will incur the $350.00 filing fee.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (dkt. no. 2) is granted; and
2. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
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