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Reverend Beck v. State A Claim Oliver W. Wanger

August 24, 2011

REVEREND BECK,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
STATE A CLAIM OLIVER W. WANGER, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO (Doc. 1)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (Doc. 13)

Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Reverend Beck, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), which provides a remedy for violation of civil rights by federal actors.*fn1 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences," Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendantpersonally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff's Claims

A. Bivens Claim Barred by Judicial Immunity

On April 7, 2010, Plaintiff filed case number 1:10-cv-00599-OWW-GBC PC Beck v. Dileo, a civil rights suit against prison officials. In this action, Plaintiff alleges that as of January 1, 2010, United States District Judge Oliver W. Wanger was on notice that Plaintiff's rights were being violated and he disregarded those violations. Further, Judge Wanger refused to recuse himself in Beck v. Dileo and he struck exhibits from the record, contrary to law and in exhibition of personal dislike for Plaintiff.

Plaintiff's claim against Judge Wanger arises in part from Plaintiff's contention that liability for the alleged ongoing violation of his constitutional rights by prison officials transferred to Judge Wanger by virtue of the fact that Judge Wanger had knowledge of the violations because he was assigned to Beck v. Dileo. Plaintiff also bases his claim in part on his disagreement with rulings made in Beck v. Dileo and his belief that the rulings evidence Judge Wanger's personal bias against him.

It is well established that judges are entitled to absolute immunity for judicial acts. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200, 106 S.Ct. 496 (1985); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 430 (9th Cir. 2010); Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). Neither the fact of the pendency of Beck v. Dileo nor the rulings issued in Beck v. Dileo provides a basis for the imposition of liability against Judge Wanger. Plaintiff's claim arises from matters which are judicial actions for which Judge Wanger is entitled to judicial immunity.

B. Section 1983 Claims

1. Defendants Cate and ...


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