The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia U.S. District Judge
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 19)
Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. (Doc. No. 19.) The motion is not opposed. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED with leave to amend.
In January 2006, Plaintiffs Robert and Valerie Zakar obtained a $792,000 loan in order to purchase real property in San Diego. (Compl. Part IV. ¶ 19.) The note on the property is secured by a Deed of Trust recorded on January 24, 2006. The Deed of Trust identifies America's Wholesale Lender ("AWL") as the lender, ReconTrust Company, N.A. ("Recon") as the trustee, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as the beneficiary.(Id. ¶ 21.)
After Plaintiffs became delinquent on their mortgage payments, Recon recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under the Deed of Trust on August 19, 2009. (Id. ¶ 25.) On April 5, 2010, Recon recorded a Notice of Trustee's Sale of the Property, referencing a sale date of April 26, 2010.
¶ 26.) The foreclosure sale scheduled for April 26th did not occur. On July 6, 2010, Recon filed a Corporation Assignment of Deed of Trust ("Corporation Assignment") in which MERS assigned its beneficial interests under the Deed of Trust to "The Bank of New York Mellon FKA The Bank of New York as Trustee for the Certificateholders CWMBS, Inc. CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-HYB 3 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-HYB3." Plaintiffs allege that the foreclosure was subsequently rescheduled for March 8, 2011. (Id. ¶ 45.)
Plaintiffs filed this action on March 4, 2011. The Complaint sets forth eleven causes of action:
(1) wrongful foreclosure by a stranger, (2) intentional fraud, (3) fraudulent concealment, (4) negligence, (5) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et , (6) violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., (7) violation of California Financial Code § 50505, (8) unfair debt collection practices under the Rosenthal Act, California Code § 1788(e)-(f), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., (9) violation of California Civil Code § 2923.5, (10) violation of California Civil Code § 2923.6, and (11) unlawful, unfair or deceptive practices.
On April 4, 2011, the Court issued an order denying Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 21.) Defendants' instant motion to dismiss was filed April 1, 2011, and is not opposed.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for: (1) "lack of cognizable legal theory," or (2) "insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim." SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). However, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Notwithstanding this deference, the reviewing court need not accept "legal conclusions" as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -- U.S. -- , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949--50, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). It is also improper for the court to assume "the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). On the other hand, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. The court only reviews the contents of the complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
Defendants first argue that several of Plaintiffs' claims are time-barred, since they arise from alleged wrongdoing that occurred at or before the loan's origination in January 2006. Plaintiffs did not file the Complaint until March 2011, more than five years later. The following ...