The opinion of the court was delivered by: Dean D. Pregerson United States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [Docket Nos. 37 & 39]
This matter comes before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor in interest by merger with Wachovia Mortgage, FSB. Defendant NDeX West LLC has joined in the motion. After reviewing the materials submitted by the parties and considering the arguments therein, the court GRANTS the motion and adopts the following order.
On April 2, 2008, Plaintiffs Reinhard and Margaret Tiefenthaler obtained a loan from Wachovia, secured by a deed of trust against the subject property at 1309 E. Country Club Blvd., Big Bear City, CA 92314 ("Property"). (Wachovia's Req. for Judicial Notice in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("RJN"), Ex. A.) Plaintiffs defaulted on their loan, so a notice of default was recorded on June 29, 2010. (RJN, Ex. B.) On October 4, 2010, a Notice of Trustee's Sale was recorded, noticing a sale on October 26, 2010. (RJN, Ex. C.) On October 5, 2010, Plaintiffs brought suit against Defendants in state court, seeking to enjoin the foreclosure sale, damages for alleged fraud, and declaratory relief. (Compl. 1:20-21 & ¶¶ 15, 61.) On October 26, 2010, the trustee's sale took place and the property was sold. (RJN, Ex. D.) On November 8, 2010, Defendants removed the action to federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal ¶ 2.)
Defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 8, and 9(b). (Dkt. No. 7.) The court granted the motion with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 21.) On May 12, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint ("FAC"). (Dkt. No. 24.) Defendants again moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint, under the same Federal Rules. (Dkt. No. 26.) The court once more granted the motion with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 35.) Plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint ("SAC"), on August 18, 2011.*fn1 (Dkt. 36.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint is subject to dismissal when the plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "all allegations of material fact are accepted as true and should be construed in the light most favorable to [the] plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 433, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), the Supreme Court explained that a court considering a 12(b)(6) motion should first "identify pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth."
Id. Next, the court should identify the complaint's "well-pleaded factual allegations, . . . assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."
Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) ("In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for, among other things, failure to comply with the pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 requires a plaintiff to "plead a short and plain statement of the elements of his or her claim, identifying the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the claim and the elements of the prima facie case." Bautista v. L.A. County, 216 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2000). It is well settled, for example, that a pleading may not simply allege a wrong has ...