UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PRIORITY SEND CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
November 17, 2011
NIELS MOTOR HOMES, INC.
CATERPILLAR, INC., ET AL.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable John F. Walter, United States District Judge
CIVIL MINUTES -- GENERAL
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS:
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
On October 26, 2011, Plaintiff Neil's Motor Homes, Inc. ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint in this Court against Defendants Caterpillar Inc. and Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff failed to properly allege the basis for subject matter
See, Local Rule 8-1 ("The statutory or other basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court shall be plainly stated in the first paragraph of any document invoking this Court's jurisdiction").
Plaintiff has also not adequately alleged the facts essential for the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court. Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Environment, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459 (1926)) ("'A plaintiff suing in a federal court must show in his pleading, affirmatively and distinctly, the existence of whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction . . . .'"). Diversity jurisdiction founded under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) requires that (1) all plaintiffs be of different citizenship than all defendants, and (2) the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, Plaintiff has failed to allege the citizenship of either of the Defendants, or that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) specifically states that "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), "a court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, , at any time during the pendency of the action, even on appeal." Snell v. Cleveland, , 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Emerich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that "[i]t is elementary that the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is not a waivable matter and may be raised at anytime by one of the parties, by motion or in the responsive pleadings, or sua sponte by the trial or reviewing court").
Accordingly, the Court hereby DISMISSES this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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