ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT DEFENDANT MOTION TO DISMISS OFFICERS WESBROOK, SARGENT
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT GRUNDEIS, AND SIX BAIL BOND ) AGENTS WITH CAUSALITY SURETY, INC.'S MOTION TO INSURANCE BOND AGENTS(S) IN ) DISMISS THEIR OWN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND DOES 1 TO 50, ) ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (Documents #8
On July 24, 2011, Plaintiff Denisa Dixon filed a first amended
complaint ("complaint") in the Kern County Superior Court. The
complaint names as Officer Wesbrook, Sergeant Grundeis,*fn1
and six bail bond agents with Causality Surety as Defendants.
On August 4, 2011, Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis removed the action
to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) because the complaint
contains claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On August 11, 2011, Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis filed a motion to dismiss. On October 21, 2011, Defendant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss.
On November 17, 2011, Plaintiff filed a document requesting the court take judicial notice. This document appears to be an opposition to Defendants' motions.
The complaint alleges that Bail Hotline Bail Bonds, located on 1014 Chester Avenue in Bakersfield, California, payed agents to apprehend Keon Brackenridge. Keon Brackenridge used Plaintiff's address as his mailing address when he was bailed out by Robin Willis. When the agents came to Plaintiff's house to find Keon Brackenridge, they assaulted and forcefully searched Plaintiff's house. The complaint alleges that the agents entered her home without a warrant and against Plaintiff's protest. The complaint alleges that the agents did not identify themselves and assaulted Plaintiff. The complaint also alleges that the agents "fabricated and claim to be Federal Agents with a legitimate search warrant."
When the agents were in her house, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff called the Bakersfield Police Department Watch Commander and asked that Police Officers be sent to her home and for a copy of any search warrant. Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis, from the Bakersfield Police Department, arrived at Plaintiff's house and refused to "Protect and Serve with deliberate indifference upon [Plaintiff's] calling the BPD for this State created agency violating [Plaintiff's] rights not to be assaulted and illegally searched." Plaintiff requested Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis obtain the agent's names so she would be able to identify them in a lawsuit for violating her Constitutional rights. Because of an argumentative interaction with Defendants Wesbrook and Grundeis, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff was denied her Civil Rights and was not served or protected by the Bakersfield Police Department.
The complaint alleges that a Fugitive Recovery Agent is not a police officer and the insurer, Casualty Surety Insurance, is being served.
The complaint alleges that Keon Brackenridge was later apprehended at Ms. Willis's house.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all of the complaint's material allegations of fact are taken as true, and the facts are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Marceau v. Balckfeet Hous. Auth., 540 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2008); Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the court is not required "to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2008); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Although they may provide the framework of a complaint, legal conclusions are not accepted as true and "[t]hreadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009); see also Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). As the Supreme Court has recently explained:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court draw the reasonable ...