The opinion of the court was delivered by: John E. Mcdermott United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF COMMISSIONER PROCEEDINGS
On December 15, 2010, Irene Melendez ("Plaintiff or Claimant") filed a complaint seeking review of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's application for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. The Commissioner filed an Answer on June 15, 2011. On September 20, 2011, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation ("JS"). The matter is now ready for decision.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties consented to proceed before this Magistrate Judge. After reviewing the pleadings, transcripts, and administrative record ("AR"), the Court concludes that the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed and this action dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff is a 59 year old female who applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits on October 6, 2005, alleging that she has been unable to work due to a herniated disc and fibromyalgia, among other things.*fn1 (AR 86.) Plaintiff alleges a disability onset date of December 16, 2003. (AR 509.)
Plaintiff's claims were denied initially by the Social Security Administration ("SSA") on December 30, 2005, and on reconsideration on March 16, 2006. (AR 46-50, 59.) Plaintiff filed a timely request for hearing, which was held on March 20, 2008, in San Bernardino, California, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Mason Harrell, Jr. (AR 505-523.) Plaintiff testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel. (AR 507.)
An unfavorable decision written by ALJ F. Keith Varni was issued on April 11, 2008. (AR 15-22.) The ALJ determined that the Claimant suffers from "a severe impairment in the musculoskeletal system from degenerative changes in the spine," but found her fibromyalgia not severe. (AR 17-18.) The ALJ assessed Claimant with a residual functional capacity ("RFC")*fn2 to perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). (AR 19.) In particular, the ALJ found that Claimant is capable of performing her past relevant work as a billing administrator. (AR 22.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Claimant has not been under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act from December 16, 2003, through the date of the decision. (AR 22.)
By Judgment and Memorandum Opinion and Order dated March 30, 2010, this Court reversed the decision of the Commissioner and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Specifically, this Court found that the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's fibromyalgia was not a medically determinable severe impairment was unsupported by substantial evidence.
A remand hearing was held on September 1, 2010, in San Bernardino. (AR 527.) The Claimant appeared and testified, and was represented by a non-attorney advocate. Vocational Expert ("VE") Joseph Mooney also testified. By written decision dated September 17, 2010, the ALJ, incorporating the earlier decision, now found that Plaintiff's fibromyalgia was severe but that she nonetheless retains the capacity for a reduced range of light work, including all her past relevant work, and that she is therefore not disabled. (AR 527-31.)
As reflected in the Joint Stipulation, the disputed issues that Plaintiff is raising as grounds for reversal and remand are as follows:
1. Whether the finding that Plaintiff's fibromyalgia allows for the performance of a slightly reduced range of light work is based on a legally proper rejection of the residual functional capacity assessments of treating internist Dr. Salwan.
2. Whether the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's claim of disability is not credible is based on a proper application of the relevant legal standards and is otherwise supported by substantial evidence.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the ALJ's decision to determine whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1991) (ALJ's disability determination must be supported by substantial evidence and based on the proper legal standards).
Substantial evidence means "'more than a mere scintilla,' but less than a preponderance." Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
This Court must review the record as a whole and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ's decision must be upheld. Morgan v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). "However, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a 'specific quantum of supporting evidence.'" Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007).
THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION
The Social Security Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or . . . can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d) (1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The first step is to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). If the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity, disability benefits will be denied. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. An impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit the claimant's ability to work. Smolen, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). Third, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment is listed, or equivalent to an impairment listed, in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appendix I of the regulations. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. If the impediment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is presumptively disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. Fourth, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir. 2001).
Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). RFC is what one "can still do despite [his or her] limitations" and represents an assessment "based on all the relevant evidence." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The RFC must account for all of the claimant's impairments, including those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-8p.
If the claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant work or has no past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth step and must determine whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing any other substantial gainful activity. Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four, consistent with the general rule that at all times the burden is on the claimant to establish his or her entitlement to benefits. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. Once this prima facie case is established by the claimant, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant may perform other gainful ...