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Marvin Goldston, Jr., Cdcr #T-07388 v. Randall Torezz; Unknown Psychiatrist

December 29, 2011

MARVIN GOLDSTON, JR., CDCR #T-07388 PLAINTIFFS,
v.
RANDALL TOREZZ; UNKNOWN PSYCHIATRIST, DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz United States District Judge

ORDER: (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [ECF No. 3]; AND (2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING COMPLAINT AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A

Plaintiff, Marvin Goldston, currently incarcerated at California State Prison located in Represa, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") [ECF No. 3].

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party's failure to prepay the entire fee only if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff's trust account statement shows that he has insufficient funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 3] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as soon as practicable after docketing." See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A.

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff's Complaint contains a number of rambling statements and it is difficult to discern the nature of his claims. While far from clear, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking to sue a psychiatrist based on his role in a study during which Plaintiff was taken off psychiatric medication. (See Compl. at 3-4.) Plaintiff indicates that after he was taken off medication he began to hear voices that told him to commit a robbery. (Id. at 4-5.)

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff has already brought identical claims in a previous action. A court "may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue." United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). A prisoner's complaint is considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) if it "merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims." Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Second, while Plaintiff has attempted to bring this action pursuant to § 1983, there are no federal law claims alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal question jurisdiction exists over "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because Plaintiff's Complaint does not comply with § 1331, there is no subject matter jurisdiction. The Court could exercise diversity jurisdiction with regard to Plaintiff's malpractice claim only if Defendant Torrezz resides in a different State than Plaintiff and the amount in controversy exceeds "the sum or value of $75,000." 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff pleads no facts to support a finding of diversity jurisdiction in this matter.

For all these reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Complaint and will provide him with an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct ...


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