The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge
FIRST SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1)
I. Screening Requirement and Standard
Plaintiff Charles Holt, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 23, 2010. The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
While prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, the pleading standard is now higher, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), and to survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
II. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claim
A. Summary of Allegations
Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison (CSATF) in Corcoran, alleges that in September 1996, Hepatitis C was detectable in his blood. Plaintiff's viral load was out of range in February 1997, but he was negative in May 1997, at which time he was in a hepatitis C evaluation and treatment program. (Comp., p. 34.) However, a determination was made that Plaintiff was not a candidate for interferon treatment. (Id.)
Plaintiff was again positive in January 1998, and in 2002, 2003, and 2004, Plaintiff's viral load count was out of normal range. Plaintiff was thereafter on interferon treatment but it was discontinued in November 2004 because he did not respond to the medication.
Plaintiff arrived at CSATF on May 11, 2006, and on December 3, 2009, blood work was run and the results were normal. (Id., pp. 4, 13.) Plaintiff alleges that he has not been provided with any medical treatment for his condition since his arrival at CSATF. Plaintiff alleges that he has been suffering from fatigue, weight fluctuation, and loss of appetite, and that he suffers from a life-threatening disease which requires aggressive preventative treatment to slow its progression.
Plaintiff names Chief Medical Officer A. Enenmoh, Physician Assistant J. Pierre, and Doctor O. Beregovskaya as defendants, and he seeks damages for the alleged violation of his rights under the ...