The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sandra M. Snyder United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM WITH LEAVE TO AMEND WITHIN THIRTY DAYS (Doc. 1)
Plaintiffs Daniel B.: Kevitsky and David-Wynn: Miller, proceeding pro se, filed this complaint on January 3, 2012, apparently alleging claims relating to certain real property owned or formerly owned by Plaintiff Kevitsky. This matter has been referred to the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and 72-304.
A court has inherent power to control its docket and the disposition of its cases with economy of time and effort for both the court and the parties. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992). This Court screens all complaints filed by plaintiffs in propria persona to ensure that the action is not frivolous or malicious, that the action states a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that the complaint does not seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
The complaint in this matter is written in a dialect other than standard American English. As a result, the Court is unable to accurately determine Plaintiffs' factual allegations, if any. The Court has determined that Kevitsky is the owner or former owner of real property located at 21702 Crystal Falls Dr., Sonora, California. On July 16, 2004, Kevitsky, denominated as an unmarried man, executed a Deed of Trust to IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., in the amount of $156,000.00. Plaintiffs' claims are somehow related to the property and the 2004 deed of trust. The Court is unable to determine in what way, if at all, Miller has claims relating to Kevitsky's property.
Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
1. a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
2. a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relied; and
3. a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief. F.R.Civ.P. 8(a).
Because the complaint has been prepared in a dialect other than standard American English, the Court cannot conclude that it meets the requirements of Rule 8 or that it states one or more cognizable claims. See Miller v. Korte, 2002 WL 32350068 (W.D. Wis. September 11, 2002) (No. 02-C-504-C). Neither the Court nor the defendants are required to interpret pleadings prepared in an unfamiliar language. "[T]he official language of the Court is standard American English." United States v. Kriemelmeyer, 2007 WL 5479293 (W.D. Wis. July 26, 2007) (No. 07-CR-052-C-01).
Rule 8 is intended "to protect defendants from undefined charges, and to keep the federal courts free of frivolous suits." Howard v. Koch, 575 F.Supp. 1299, 1304 (E.D. N.Y. 1982). Put another way, "[t]he purpose of Rule 8(a)(2) is to avoid verbose allegations; to notify the defendants of the claim upon which plaintiff seeks recovery; to assist and not deter the disposition of the litigation on its merits; to achieve brevity and clarity in pleading and to shape the issues for trial." ...