The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION AS SUCCESSIVE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (Doc. 1)
ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO CLOSE THE ACTION
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and with counsel with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Petitioner has consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case, including the entry of final judgment, by manifesting consent in a writing signed by Petitioner's counsel of record and filed on Petitioner's behalf on January 10, 2011 (doc. 5). Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on December 8, 2011.
I. Screening the Petition
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court...." Habeas Rule 4; O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990).
Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2001).
Petitioner is serving a sentence imposed by the Kern County Superior Court of life without the possibility of parole pursuant to convictions of murder, kidnaping for purposes of robbery, and robbery committed on June 16, 1995, in violation of Cal. Pen. Code §§ 187, 209(b), and 212.5(b). (Pet. 2.) In the petition, Petitioner challenges the judgment on the grounds that the trial court improperly excluded expert testimony on intimate partner battering and its effect on her. (Id. at 1-2.
The present petition is not the first petition filed with respect to the judgment pursuant to which Petitioner is detained. The Court may take judicial notice of court records. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993); Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981). The Court will take judicial notice of its own dockets.
In Mary Elizabeth Stroder v. Derral Adams, case number CIV F-00-5582-REC-HGB-HC, on November 22, 2002, the Court denied on the merits a petition that challenged Petitioner's 1995 Kern County conviction of first degree murder, kidnaping, and robbery with special allegations. (Doc. 37, 1-22; doc. 38.) On appeal, the judgment denying the petition was affirmed. (Id. at doc. 59.)
Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999).
Under the AEDPA, a federal court must dismiss a second or successive petition that raises the same grounds as a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The Court must also dismiss a second or successive petition raising a new ground unless the petitioner can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive, constitutional right or 2) the factual basis of the claim was not previously discoverable through due diligence, and the new facts establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional ...