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Shepard Johnson v. Chester Mitchell

January 27, 2012

SHEPARD JOHNSON, PLAINTIFF,
v.
CHESTER MITCHELL, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gregory G. Hollows United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER

Plaintiff first initiated this diversity action against numerous defendants for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution on July 23, 2010 and is currently proceeding with the third amended complaint filed on November 6, 2011. (See Dkt. No. 119.)

Plaintiff, a citizen of California, is a real estate developer who claims that the defendants purchased lots for a planned unit development on an island in Panama. (See Third Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 119 ["TAC"] at 2-3.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants did not want to be subject to the Conditions, Covenants, and Restrictions ("CC&Rs") for the development, and so rather than settling the matter by way of a contract dispute, defendants "banded together and launched a barrage of deliberate falsehoods, and engaged in wrongful conduct...aimed at upsetting and intimidating him, destroying his reputation and business, disrupting relations with other lot owners, and discouraging prospective purchasers. (TAC at 3-4.) Defendants also allegedly initiated criminal proceedings against him in the Panama courts which were purportedly later dismissed, and which are the subject of plaintiff's malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims. (TAC at 4-6.)

On December 8, 2011, defendant Martha Thomas filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's third amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, currently noticed for hearing on February 9, 2012. (Dkt. Nos. 131, 141.) In response to that motion, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery, or in the alternative a 30-day extension to respond to defendant Thomas's motion to dismiss, which came on regularly for hearing on January 26, 2012. (Dkt. No. 143.) A status conference in this matter was also set for and conducted on that same date. (Dkt. No. 118.)

At the hearing on plaintiff's motion for jurisdictional discovery and the status conference, plaintiff appeared pro se, John Cantor appeared via telephone on behalf of defendant Martha Thomas, Kelly Pope appeared on behalf of defendants David Miner and Sarah Miner, Gary Smith appeared on behalf of defendants Michael Mode and Lynn Yarrington, and Elizabeth Norris appeared on behalf of defendants Todd Johnson, Viki Kiman, Efim Shargorodsky, and Elena Shargorodsky. After consideration of the papers in support of and in opposition to plaintiff's motion, the parties' status reports, and the parties' oral arguments, the court now issues the following order.

Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Even if a party does not question the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the court is required to raise and address the issue sua sponte. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990) ("The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction...."). Here, in the joint status report, defendants specifically indicated that they dispute federal subject matter jurisdiction based on the presence of U.S. citizen defendants residing abroad.

The United States Supreme Court held that United States citizens domiciled in a foreign country cannot be parties to a diversity action in federal court. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828-29 (1989). In Newman-Green, Inc., an Illinois corporation brought a state-law contract action in federal district court against a Venezuelan corporation, four Venezuelan citizens, and William L. Bettison, a United States citizen domiciled in Venezuela. Id. at 828. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that Bettison's presence destroyed complete diversity in the action:

In order to be a citizen of a State within the meaning of the diversity statute, a natural person must both be a citizen of the United States and be domiciled within the State...The problem in this case is that Bettison, although a United States citizen, has no domicile in any State. He is therefore "stateless" for purposes of § 1332(a)(3). Subsection 1332(a)(2), which confers jurisdiction in the District Court when a citizen of a State sues aliens only, also could not be satisfied because Bettison is a United States citizen. When a plaintiff sues more than one defendant in a diversity action, the plaintiff must meet the requirements of the diversity statute for each defendant or face dismissal...Here, Bettison's "stateless" status destroyed complete diversity under § 1332(a)(3), and his United States citizenship destroyed complete diversity under § 1332(a)(2).

Id. at 828-29 (emphasis in original).

In this case, plaintiff alleged that "defendant Maurine E. Smith is a citizen of the United States and resides in the Republic of Panama, defendant Judith A. Cohen is a citizen of the United States and resides in the Republic of Panama, defendant Susan Fine is a citizen of the United States and resides in the Republic of Panama and possibly the state of Oregon." (TAC at 2-3.) These Panama-based U.S. citizen defendants were only named as defendants after plaintiff most recently amended his complaint. (Compare Dkt. Nos. 80 and 119.)

Generally, "a person is domiciled in a location where he or she has established a fixed habitation or abode in a particular place, and intends to remain there permanently or indefinitely...." Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1986). A person residing in a given state is not necessarily domiciled there. Id. at 750. For example, a person may be residing in a particular country temporarily for a specific purpose, such as a temporary work assignment. Here, however, the language of plaintiff's complaint can only be fairly construed as asserting that the above-mentioned defendants (at least Smith and Cohen) are residing in Panama indefinitely. Indeed, plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that defendants (at least Smith and Cohen) are only in Panama on a temporary basis and intend to return to the United States. This is particularly significant in light of the fact that the party asserting diversity jurisdiction -- plaintiff -- bears the burden of alleging and proving jurisdiction. Id. at 749.

Therefore, it would appear that these U.S. citizen defendants in Panama destroy complete diversity. Without complete diversity, this court has no subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the court indicated that plaintiff may have to dismiss the U.S. citizens domiciled abroad to cure the jurisdictional defects*fn1 or dismiss the action and pursue his claims in state court.

At the status conference, plaintiff requested an opportunity to research and further brief the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. In light of this request, the court ...


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